Systemic Crisis, Systemic Fear: An Exchange by Kliman, Andrew et al.
Value and Crisis, Kliman
 
 
 
61 
 
 
Value and Crisis:  
Bichler and Nitzan versus Marx 
 
Andrew Kliman 
 
Editors’ Note: In this article, Andrew Kliman responds to Bichler and Nitzan’s recent paper on 
‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (2010). He then goes on to 
raise a series of issues concerning the critique of Marxian value theory which these authors put 
forward in their book Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). It is followed by a 
rejoinder from Bichler and Nitzan. 
 
Introduction 
 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s (B&N) ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and 
the Future of Capitalism’ (Bichler and Nitzan, 2010) argues that ‘systemic fear’ – fear of 
the death of the capitalism – has gripped capitalists during the last decade, as it did during 
the Great Depression. Their evidence for this claim consists of the alleged fact that these 
two periods of crisis were the only periods since World War I in which equity (stock) 
prices and current profits were strongly correlated.1 
 Employing the same methods and data as B&N, Part I of this response shows 
that equity prices and current profits were also strongly correlated during the so-called 
golden age of capitalism! This should cause us to doubt B&N’s claim that systemic fear 
has prevailed in recent years. I then argue that flaws in their reasoning should also cause 
us to doubt their claim that capitalists are normally convinced that capitalism is eternal, as 
well as their claim that this conviction is crucial to its continued existence. But if the future 
of capitalism doesn’t hinge on the conviction that the system is eternal, it also doesn’t 
much matter whether capitalists have recently been gripped by systemic fear in B&N’s 
sense.  
Good old regular fear, “the dread and apprehension that regularly puncture 
[capitalists’] habitual greed” (Bichler and Nitzan, 2010, p. 18), is another matter. There 
can be little doubt that good old regular fear was intense at the start of the last decade, and 
even more intense at the end.  
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I believe that this good old regular fear was justified and that it remains so. The 
underlying long-run economic problems that led to the recent Great Recession, and to 
the weakness of the subsequent recovery, have not been resolved. Slow growth of 
employment relative to investment during the last six decades has led to a persistent fall in 
the rate of profit; the fall in the rate of profit has caused capital accumulation and 
economic growth to be sluggish for decades; and this sluggishness has led to mounting 
debt burdens (see Kliman, 2011). I doubt that the fall in the rate of profit can be reversed 
or that the debt problem can be solved without much more destruction of capital value –
i.e. falling prices of real estate, securities, and means of production, as well as physical 
destruction – than has taken place to date. And if these problems remain unresolved, the 
economy will continue to be relatively stagnant and prone to crisis. 
But it is difficult to discuss these ideas with B&N, or at all, because they and 
others like them contend that the theory on which the ideas are based, Marx’s value 
theory, is internally inconsistent and circular. An internally inconsistent theory cannot 
possibly be correct.2 All ideas resting upon such a foundation can thus be disqualified at 
the starting gate, without further ado. In order to clear the ground for a genuine 
discussion – one in which B&N’s approach to questions of crisis and the future of 
capitalism is compared with and contrasted to something rather than nothing – Part II of 
this paper responds to the main criticisms of Marx’s value theory contained in their 
recent book, Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). In the course of that response, 
I will discuss inter alia how Marx’s value theory helps to illuminate the long-term 
difficulties that led to the Great Recession and its “new normal” aftermath. Part III 
concludes. 
 
I. ‘Systemic Fear’ and Capitalists’ Convictions 
 
B&N (2010, p. 17) argue that “if we adhere to the scriptures of modern finance, we 
should expect to see no systematic association between equity prices and current profits.” 
And they claim that equity prices have indeed become decoupled from current profits 
since 1917, except during two brief and exceptional periods. “Figure 2 and Table 2 show 
two clear exceptions to the rule: the first occurred during the 1930s, the second during 
the 2000s. In both periods … equity prices moved together—and tightly so—with 
current earnings” (Bichler and Nitzan 2010, p. 17) [emphasis altered]. 
However, their Figure 2 actually shows four clear exceptions to the alleged rule. 
Equity prices also moved together with current earnings – and tightly so – from the early 
1950s to the early 1960s, and from the early 1960s to the early 1970s (see my Figure 1). 
During the first of these additional “exceptional” periods, period 4 of my Table 1, the 
correlation between equity prices and current earnings was stronger than during the 
Great Depression (period 2). During the other “exceptional” period that B&N fail to 
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bring to our attention, period 5, the correlation was lower, but still considerably stronger 
than during the 2000s (period 7).3 The percentage of the variation in one variable that is 
“explained” by, or attributable to, the variation in the other is the square of the correlation 
coefficient, r2. Thus, as Table 1 shows, only about two-fifths of the variation in share prices 
during period 7 is attributable to variations in current profits; the explained variation 
during period 4 is almost twice as great, while the explained variation during period 5 is 
more than 50% greater.4 
Table 1 also shows that share prices have been strongly and positively 
correlated with current profits more than 40% of the time since 1917, and almost half the 
time since 1929. So the “exceptions” are not exceptional; the “rule” that share prices and 
current profits have become decoupled is no rule at all.  
 
 
Figure 1. S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1953–1962 & 1962–1973 (3-
year moving averages of annual rates of change) 
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Table 1. S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Annual Rates of 
Growth of Price and Earnings per Share  
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving averages) 
 
Period Number of months 
Correlation 
(r) 
Share-price variation 
explained (r2) 
1 Oct. 1917 – Dec. 1929 146 0.29 8% 
2 Dec. 1929 – Feb. 1939 110 0.89 79% 
3 Feb. 1939 – June 1953 172 –0.34 12% 
4 June 1953 – Aug. 1962 110 0.90 81% 
5 Aug. 1962 – Dec. 1973 136 0.80 65% 
6 Dec. 1973 – Sept. 2000 321 –0.20 4% 
7 Sept. 2000 – Mar. 2010 114 0.65 42% 
  
Strongly positive-correlation periods: 2, 4, 5, and 7 
 
42% of total months since Oct. 1917; 49% of total months since Dec. 1929 
 
But B&N haven’t merely gotten their facts wrong. Because their facts are wrong, so is 
their paper’s key claim that we can infer that investors are gripped by “systemic fear” when 
the relationship between current profits and equity prices is strong and positive. They tell 
us that the two periods in which systemic fear prevailed were two periods of acute crisis, 
the Great Depression and the 2000s. If a strongly positive correlation between current 
profits and share prices were another exceptional feature of these periods of crisis, then 
the notion that we can infer the existence of systemic fear from the positive correlation 
might be plausible. But the 1930s and 2000s were not exceptional in that respect, as we 
have seen. And the other two strongly positive-correlation periods, which run from the 
early 1950s through the early 1970s, cannot plausibly be characterized as a time of 
systemic fear. On the contrary, that era was the so-called golden age of capitalism.5 So a 
strongly positive correlation between current profits and equity prices does not allow us 
to infer the existence of systemic fear. 
But the correlation data are B&N’s only evidence that capitalists were gripped 
by systemic fear in the 1930s and 2000s. (The statements by the Financial Times, Alan 
Greenspan, Bernie Sucher, Gillian Tett, and Mervyn King quoted in their paper discuss a 
highly uncertain environment, economic crisis, and discredited economic theory and 
ideology, not fear of the death of capitalism.) So they have not given us a good reason to 
accept that claim. 
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Nor do they give us a good reason to accept that the opposite of systemic fear –
the conviction that capitalism is eternal – is the norm. Their ‘demonstration’ that 
capitalists are almost always guided by this conviction is fatally flawed. And since the 
same demonstration is the basis upon which B&N (2010, p. 3) claim that “[t]his … 
conviction is necessary for the existence of modern capitalism, at least in its present form,” 
they also fail to give us a good reason to accept this latter claim.  
The most glaring flaw in their ‘demonstration’ comes at the end, when they 
write, “the fact that capitalists invest shows that they expect … that the value of their 
assets will grow, not contract – and that expectation means that, consciously or not, they 
also think that the ritual that valuates their assets will never end” (Bichler and Nitzan, 
2010, pp. 3-4) [emphasis added]. The italicised clause is simply false. Just as some people 
buy lottery tickets even if they don’t expect to hit the jackpot, some people buy shares of 
stock even if they don’t expect their prices to rise. A large enough jackpot or a large 
enough potential capital gain more than makes up for a low probability of success.  
Hence, the fact that people invest does not mean that they normally expect capitalism to 
last forever.  
Imagine, for instance, that you think that there’s only a 50-50 chance that 
capitalism will exist a year from now, and that you are considering buying shares of stock 
for $10,000 today. If capitalism doesn’t survive, you’ll lose the whole $10,000, so it would 
be better to spend the $10,000 now, not invest it. You believe that this outcome is as likely 
as not, but you also believe that if capitalism does survive, the shares will be worth 
$500,000 a year from now. If you are like most people, you’ll go ahead and invest. 
 Secondly, dozens upon dozens of experiments conducted by Nobel laureate 
Vernon Smith and colleagues (e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Porter and 
Smith, 2003) during the past quarter century have demonstrated conclusively that 
people frequently invest in assets even when know that “capitalism” (i.e., its experimental 
equivalent) will soon perish. Participants in the experiments are given some cash and 
some shares of an imaginary equity. They are told that the shares will pay dividends for a 
fixed length of time, such as fifteen periods, and that the experiment will then end, at 
which point the shares will be worthless. The current fundamental value of a share – the 
sum of the average per-period dividends throughout the remainder of the experiment – is 
announced at the start of each period.6 Participants can buy additional shares from other 
participants, sell their shares, or hold onto them and collect their dividends. At the end of 
the experiment, they get to keep their initial cash endowments, dividends, and any net 
capital gains they have obtained.   
Now, B&N (2010, p. 3) claim to demonstrate that if capitalists believed that 
the system “would cease to exist at some future point,” then share prices “would have no-
where to trend but down,” and capitalists would therefore be unwilling to buy additional 
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shares. But even though participants in the experiments are absolutely certain that the 
system (i.e., the experiment) will soon cease to exist and that the asset’s fundamental 
value is continually falling, share prices typically rise throughout much or most of the 
experiment – big bubbles are formed – and the volume of investment in additional shares 
is typically heavy. This has been the routine outcome even when the participants in the 
experiments are over-the-counter stock dealers, businesspeople, or students at the 
California Institute of Technology or the Wharton School.  
Research into why this ‘perverse’ behavior occurs is still ongoing, but the basic 
reason why people buy shares that eventually become worthless, and whose prices must 
therefore eventually fall, is obvious. People think that they may well make a substantial 
profit in the meantime, by reselling the shares at prices higher than those they paid.  
Finally, even if the rest of B&N’s ‘demonstration’ were sound, it would not 
prove that capitalists are normally guided by the conviction that capitalism is eternal. At 
least it wouldn’t prove this if we use the word “conviction” in the normal way. B&N are 
undoubtedly aware that it would not, since they write that “consciously or not, 
[capitalists] also think that the ritual that valuates their assets will never end” [emphasis 
added].  I doubt that “unconscious conviction” is a coherent concept, but even if it is, 
B&N’s appeal to it turns what started out as a provocative and straightforward claim into 
a piece of unfalsifiable Freudian speculation.7 
 
II. Nitzan and Bichler’s Critique of Marx 
 
Marx’s supposed logical errors are a major theme of Nitzan and Bichler’s (N&B’s) recent 
book.8 They put forward what they call an “alternative” to both “mainstream and Marxist 
political economy” (p. xxv), and their main justification for doing so is technical and 
logical: Marx’s value theory and mainstream economics are riddled with “circularities and 
contradictions” (p. 144). And since these theories are logically unsound, N&B argue, 
their alternative is not merely something they prefer; it and its further development are 
needed, objectively (p. 144). Because N&B focus on the logical issues at stake, my 
commentary shall do so as well, though I shall also discuss how Marx’s value theory can 
help us understand the long-term problems that resulted in the Great Recession.  
This part of the paper begins with a discussion of how N&B critique Marx for 
alleged methodological sins that they themselves commit. I then consider their critique of 
Marx’s theory that real-world prices and profit are determined by the production of value 
and surplus-value. I will respond to their allegation––or, rather, their repetition of a hoary 
allegation––that Marx’s theory of the value-price relationship is internally inconsistent. I 
will also respond to their critique of the temporal single-system interpretation (TSSI) of 
Marx’s value theory, an interpretation that refutes this and other allegations that the 
theory is inconsistent.9 Finally, I discuss their criticisms of Marx’s distinction between 
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productive and unproductive labour, his concept of abstract labour, and the manner in 
which he “reduced” complex (skilled) labour to simple (unskilled) labour. 
 
A. Stone-Throwing 
 
N&B complain that “Marx nowhere explains why the additional value-creating capacity 
of skilled labour should bear any particular relationship to the labour cost of acquiring the 
skill. The fact that an engineer trains 10 per cent longer does not mean she will create 10 
per cent more value; it could also be 1 per cent, 20 per cent or any other number” (p. 
142). Yet when they come to their own theory, they tell us that if one company’s market 
capitalization is a thousand times as great as the average capitalization, its owners are a 
thousand times as powerful as the owners of an average company (p. 313). Why 1000 
times as powerful, and not 100 times or 2000 times or any other number?  
They wish this problem away by defining power in terms of market 
capitalization: a market cap that is 1000 times as great as the average doesn’t give the 
owners 1000 times as much power; it simply is 1000 times as much power. This 
identification of capital and power––capital as power––is certainly not correct in a literal 
sense. As N&B (p. 312) cheerfully admit, it is a “figurative identity.” This means that 
Capital as Power is a work of fiction, or what they call a “scientific story” (p. 313).10 
Although they throw stones at Marx for quantifying the unquantifiable, they themselves 
live in a glass house.  
 In other words, if we were to assume for the sake of argument that all of their 
many technical objections to Marx’s value theory are valid, he would then be guilty of 
exactly what N&B are guilty of – measuring what cannot be measured, creating a 
“figurative identity” between things that are not identical, and using these fictional 
measures and identities to tell a “scientific story.” So what entitles them to criticize (what 
they take to be) his method, given that it is their method as well? Their apparent answer 
to this question is that  
… we have seen what happened to liberal and Marxist analyses when they tried 
to imitate th[e] rigour [of natural science]. They pretended that there is a strict 
quantitative correspondence between prices, production and accumulation on 
the one hand and utility and labour values on the other, and then fell flat on 
their faces when they tried to demonstrate this correspondence. (p. 313) 
 
Now, N&B themselves pretend that there is a strict quantitative correspondence between 
power and market capitalization. In that respect, then, there is no difference between their 
method and the method that Marx allegedly employed. Thus the only difference is that 
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they refrain from trying to demonstrate their pretend correspondence; they simply assert 
it as a “figurative identity.” But a glass house is no more shatterproof when one admits that 
it is made of glass than when one tries to demonstrate that it is made of brick. So N&B are 
still not entitled to throw stones. 
 
B. Marx’s Alleged Inconsistency 
 
N&B’s allegation that Marx’s value theory is internally inconsistent focuses mainly on his 
account of the relationship between commodities’ values and their average prices (price 
of production). Marx claimed to show that the “law of value” on which Capital is based 
holds true at the level of the economy as a whole, even though the prices that individual 
companies and industries receive for their products deviate from the products’ actual 
values.11 He argued that these price-value deviations merely cause value and surplus-value 
(profit) to be distributed differently; they do not alter the economy-wide aggregate value 
of output, aggregate surplus-value, or the economy-wide rate of profit. As N&B (pp. 99-
100) recognize,  
These aggregate equalities are crucial. … [T]he rate of profit in price terms is 
equal to the rate of profit in value terms. It is through this determination of the 
rate of profit that the value system anchors the price system. … Marx claimed 
his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it did 
something they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit from the 
material conditions of the labour process.  
But they claim that Marx has been proven wrong. “Bortkiewicz … demonstrated that 
Marx’s solution of pulling and redistributing is logically inconsistent” and that “it could be 
fixed only by making the rate of profit independent of the value system” (p. 99-100). 
 Yet N&B’s discussion of Marx’s alleged inconsistency is itself internally 
inconsistent. A few pages later, when discussing the TSSI, they implicitly shift to an 
agnostic position on the internal inconsistency question. In their discussion of the 
temporal aspect of the TSSI, they write, “There is really no way to decide which of these 
two methods [temporal valuation or simultaneous valuation] is ‘valid’. … there is no 
objective yardstick … to tell us which method to use” (p. 107). And when they discuss 
the single-system aspect of the TSSI, they write, “Proponents of the TSSI argue that this is 
what Marx had in mind. And maybe they are right” (p. 109). But if one aspect of the TSSI 
is not invalid, and its only other aspect is possibly what Marx had in mind, then the TSSI 
is possibly a correct exegetical interpretation of Marx’s theory.12 And since this possibly 
correct interpretation eliminates the apparent internal inconsistencies in his theory, a fact 
that N&B accept,13 it follows that the charge of inconsistency is possibly false. So while 
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they wish to convict Marx of inconsistency, their own arguments imply that he is possibly 
not guilty. 
 
Price vs. Money, Value vs. Labour-time 
 
N&B’s critiques of Marx and the TSSI are marred by a great many inaccuracies, most of 
which seem to stem from their apparent belief that Marx measured commodities’ values 
exclusively in terms of labour-time, and not also in terms of money. For instance, they 
refer to “the issue of ‘transforming the resulting labour values into money prices,” and 
they assert that, “according to Marx, the value of a commodity denotes the abstract labour 
time necessary for its production” (p. 89, p. 96, emphases added). This belief is entirely 
unwarranted.  
 It is true that, in recent decades, many ‘Marxian economists’ have measured 
prices exclusively in money terms but values exclusively in labour-time terms – perhaps as 
a way of justifying their dual-system interpretations and revisions of Marx’s theory –but 
Marx himself did not do so. In chapter 1 of Capital, vol. 1, he analyzed the “money form” 
of value, and he noted at the start of chapter 3 that “Money as a measure of value is the 
necessary form of appearance of the measure of value that is immanent in commodities, 
namely labour-time” (Marx 1990a, p. 188). And Capital is chock-full of examples in 
which values are measured in money terms. Here are a few, from chapters 7, 8, and 9: 
 
… the sum of the values of the commodities thrown into the process [of yarn 
production] amounts to 27 shillings. The value of the yarn is 30 shillings. 
Therefore the value of the product is one-ninth greater than the value 
advanced to produce it; 27 shillings have turned into 30 shillings; a surplus-
value of 3 shillings has been precipitated.  
 
However useful a given … means of production may be, even if it cost £150 or, 
say, 500 hours of labour, it cannot under any circumstances add more than 
£150 to the value of the product.  
 
[During] six hours of labour he [the worker] has added a value of three 
shillings. This value is the excess of the total value of the product over the 
portion of its value contributed by the means of production.  
 
[T]he value of this commodity is (£410 constant [capital] + £90 variable 
[capital]) + £90 surplus[-value]. The original capital has now changed from … 
£500 to £590. The difference is s, or a surplus-value of £90. [Marx 1990a, p. 
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301, p. 314, p. 316, p. 320] 
 
Because they are apparently unfamiliar with the fact that Marx measured value in terms of 
money as well as labour-time, N&B think that labour-time values need to be 
“transformed” or “converted” into money prices.14 They thus seriously misunderstand the 
issue that Marx addressed in his account of the transformation of values into prices of 
production, and Bortkiewicz’s critique of that account, and the single-system aspect of the 
TSSI. They tell us that the “transformation problem” controversy is about Marx having 
supposedly mixed and matched variables measured in terms of labour time and variables 
measured in terms of money:   
According to Bortkiewicz, the inconsistency occurs because Marx’s 
transformation is incomplete. It converts surplus value counted in labour time 
into profits counted in [money] prices, but it does not do the same for constant 
and variable capital. The resulting price system therefore is half-baked––partly 
[money] price denominated, partly [labour-time] value denominated. (p. 99) 
This is simply not the case. The controversy pertains exclusively to alleged quantitative 
discrepancies between values and prices, and between surplus-value and profit. It has 
nothing to do with the units in which the variables are measured. (At least it had nothing 
to do with units of measurement before poorly informed commentators on the 
controversy got their hands on it a few decades ago). In other words, the controversy 
deals with the following kind of question: If the value of output and surplus-value in the 
economy as a whole are $120 trillion and $15 trillion, must the price of output and profit 
also be $120 trillion and $15 trillion, or can they be, say, $105 trillion and $25 trillion? It 
has nothing to do with whether a total price of $105 trillion is equal or unequal to a total 
value of 1.2 trillion labour-hours; the very question is meaningless. 
Bortkiewicz understood perfectly well that Marx measured value in terms of 
money: 
the theory of the equality of total value and total price—a theorem to which 
Marx and the Marxists attach so great an importance—is generally wrong. 
…This situation is in no way altered by the fact that Marx thought of values 
and prices in terms of money. (Bortkiewicz, 1952, pp. 10–11) [emphasis 
added] 
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Bortkiewicz’s ‘Proof’ 
 
Thus, when he claimed to prove that Marx’s account of the transformation was internally 
inconsistent, Bortkiewicz did not allege that Marx mixed and matched labour-time and 
money variables. He argued that Marx’s account led to spurious quantitative 
discrepancies between, for instance, the amount of G (gold) spent to purchase machines 
and the amount of G charged by the producers of replacement machines. And he claimed 
to prove that this discrepancy implied a spurious “break[...] down” of the economy 
(Bortkiewicz, 1952, pp. 8–10), because the amount of G spent to purchase machines may 
well fall far short of what is needed to replace used-up machines.  
 But this ‘proof’ has itself been disproved (see, e.g., Kliman, 2007, ch. 8). The 
crux of the refutation is the recognition of a very simple fact: the amount of gold (or 
accounting money, etc.) received by the producers of replacement machines and the 
amount of gold spent on the original machines can and generally do differ, because the 
original machines are bought before the replacement machines are sold. Consequently, 
the difference between these two amounts does not mean that the amount of gold 
received by the producers of the replacement machines differs from the amount of gold 
spent on replacement machines, and it therefore does not imply any spurious breakdown 
of the economy. Notice that just as the “proof” does not involve any issue of units of 
measurement, neither does the refutation.  
 More than two decades have passed since the refutation of Bortkiewicz’s 
“proof” was first published, and it has yet to be disproved itself. Laibman (2004, p.10), the 
only critic of Marx to have addressed it in print, has acknowledged that the refutation 
demonstrates that “Reproduction equilibrium exists between periods.” In other words, 
Marx’s account does not imply a spurious breakdown of the economy.  
 N&B (p. 99 and p. 99 n12) endorse Bortkiewicz’s proof, but fail to explain 
why. They do not demonstrate that the refutation contains any error. They do not even 
acknowledge its existence, even though they certainly should be aware of it, since they cite 
three works (Kliman and McGlone, 1999; Kliman, 2004; Kliman, 2007) in which the 
refutation prominently appears.  
Their silence on this matter is quite important, since what is at stake is the 
logical validity of Marx’s theory that the “price” rate of profit of the real world is equal to 
and determined by the “value” rate of profit, i.e., the ratio of the amount of surplus-value 
pumped out of the workforce to the sum of value invested. Having supposedly proved 
that Marx’s account was internally inconsistent, Bortkiewicz (1984) went on to produce a 
“correction” that fails to preserve this crucial aggregate equality. Yet if his proof is false, 
there is nothing to correct. Marx’s theory of how the real-world rate of profit is 
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determined cannot properly be rejected by appealing to Bortkiewicz’s results. But that is 
what N&B do.  
 
Single-System Valuation 
 
Their apparent failure to understand that Marx measured values in terms of both labour-
time and money also causes them to misunderstand the single-system aspect of the TSSI, 
and to allege that Marx’s value theory becomes a “tautology” and a “dogma” when it is 
understood as a single-system theory (p. 109).15 Once values and prices are no longer 
conceived as being determined in two separate systems, they argue, there is “nothing to 
transform in the first place”: 
The conventional Marxist approach argues that labour values are the cause of 
prices. This causal link is meaningful because the definitions of the two 
magnitudes are different. Prices are counted in money, whereas values are 
counted in labour time. …  
 
The setup of the TSSI is completely different. Here, there is no point in asking 
whether or not prices are equal to values, simply because values are defined by 
market prices. … Labour is still held responsible, by definition, for the creation 
of all value in the aggregate. But it is no longer necessary for any of the 
underlying computations. …  
 
And since value is made proportionate to both price and labour time, it follows 
that prices are proportionate to labour time and that the labour theory of value 
is true before we even begin. … 
 
[The result] is not a scientific theory in the sense of cause X (value) explaining 
consequence Y (price). (pp. 108–109) [emphases in original] 
 
These objections are based on N&B’s mistaken belief that Marx measured values 
exclusively in labour-time terms and their consequent mistaken belief he tried to explain 
how labour-time magnitudes are transformed into monetary ones in his account of the 
transformation of values into prices of production. If these beliefs were correct, then the 
fact that the TSSI understands both the values and the prices of Marx’s transformation 
account as monetary magnitudes would indeed imply what N&B think it implies, namely 
that the TSSI construes the values as well as the prices as price magnitudes rather than as 
value magnitudes. Hence, there would be “nothing to transform in the first place,” and 
“the labour theory of value [would be] true before we even begin.” It would also be an 
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empty tautology and a dogma. But since N&B’s beliefs are not correct, none of these 
conclusions follow from the fact that values and prices are both measured in terms of 
money. 
First of all, when the total value and total price of output are both understood 
as monetary sums, there still remains a “point in asking whether or not prices are equal to 
values” because it is conceivable that they differ quantitatively. For instance, if the 
capitalist class were able to create profit, in the aggregate, by selling commodities for more 
than they are actually worth – i.e., if monopolies and other firms that reap extra profit in 
this way were able to do so without reducing other firms’ profits to the same degree – 
then total price (the aggregate monetary value received) would exceed total value (the 
aggregate monetary value produced). But Marx demonstrated in chapter 5 of Capital, 
volume 1 that extra value cannot originate in this way in the economy as a whole, and his 
account of the transformation of values into prices of production in chapter 9 of volume 3 
is based on the same principle. Indeed, the overriding purpose of that account is to show 
that the existence of quantitative price-value deviations in individual industries does not 
contradict the notion that total price and profit are determined by and equal 
(quantitatively) to total value and surplus-value.  
And contrary to what N&B claim, “cause X (value) explain[s] consequence Y 
(price)” is affirmed by the TSSI as well. In the first paragraph of the passage I quoted at 
the start of this section, they seem to suggest that causal links are meaningful only when 
the cause and the effect are measured in different units. This is simply not the case. The 
$10 million in retirement taxes that a government collects is the “cause” (source) of the 
$10 million in benefits that retirees receive, because the collection precedes the receipt 
and the prior collection of $10 million fully accounts for the receipt of $10 million. The 
fact that the tax revenue collected is measured in dollars rather than in labour-hours does 
not make the causal connection meaningless. By the same token, in Marx’s theory and in 
the temporal single-system interpretation of that theory, the production of value and 
surplus-value precedes the receipt of value and profit by means of sale, and the prior 
production of value and surplus-value fully accounts for the amounts of sales revenue and 
profit received.  
B&N’s claim that “Labour … is no longer necessary for any of the underlying 
[TSSI] computations” is also incorrect. As Table 2 illustrates, labour is a crucial 
determinant.16 The total price of output is $100 because the total value of output is $100, 
and the total value of output is $100 because workers’ labour added $60 of new value 
(and $40 of existing value was preserved and transferred to the products during 
production). And workers’ labour added $60 of new value because, only because, value-
creating workers performed 60 minutes of work and each minute of their work created $1 
of new value. The example simply stipulates the amount of new value that was created by 
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a minute of work, but this magnitude is in fact determined by actual data, prior to the start 
of production, and it can be estimated using available national account data (though 
N&B will surely say that the estimates are just as “meaningless” as official inflation 
estimates, which they also dismiss (p. 135). In sum, causation proceeds from left to right, 
following the arrow of time, so the total price of output, and thus total profit and the 
average real-world rate of profit, are determined by, but not determinants of, the other 
variables.17   
 
Table 2 
 
 Pre-production During production Post-production 
 
Branch 
Value transferred 
from used-up means 
of production (a) 
Value added by 
living labour (b) 
Total value of 
output (a + b) 
Total 
price 
of output 
$30 
20 labour-minutes  
$20 
$50 $65 
1 
2 
$10 
40 labour-minutes  
$40 
$50 $35 
 
Total 
 
$40 
60 labour-minutes  
$60 
$100 $100 
 
Temporal Valuation 
 
I turn now to N&B’s discussion of the other aspect of the TSSI, temporal valuation. As I 
noted above (see note 12), their discussion of whether it is the right “method to use” and 
their agnostic position on this matter are not germane to the issue of the logical 
consistency of Marx’s theory. When the theory is construed as temporal (and single-
system), it is consistent. If temporal valuation is not the right method to use, then the 
theory is consistent but wrong, which has no bearing on whether the TSSI is a correct 
exegetical interpretation.   
 However, N&B seem to suggest that it might not be a correct interpretation for 
a different reason. “According to Michael Perelman (1990), Marx himself left the issue 
open. He used antecedent (past) labour at the micro level of the firm and coexisting 
(current) labour at the macro level of capitalism as a whole” (p. 107). But Perelman’s 
argument supports the TSSI, because the production of commodities and their values 
takes place at the “micro level.” As he noted, “Marx held to the notion that the production 
of an individual commodity should be framed in the context of antecedent labour, as a 
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succession of isolated labour processes... Co-existing labour is more appropriate for a 
discussion of ‘the production process in its continuous motion and in the entirety of its 
conditions, and not merely as an isolated action or a limited part of it’” (Perelman, 1990, 
p.  68). [Emphasis added; the interior quote is from Marx]. 
 Although N&B say that temporal valuation is not invalid, they also write that:   
the TSSI allows each barrel of oil to have its own value – depending on its 
particular temporal position in the production process. This difference allows 
the TSSI to appear more theoretically ‘robust’ than its conventional alternative 
– but that appearance is misleading. Obviously, if the same commodity can 
have multiple values, the likelihood of the valuation system as a whole being 
logically inconsistent is much reduced. (2009, p. 107) 
 
It is very hard to make sense of this statement. Isn’t logical consistency a crucial part of 
what makes a theory or interpretation robust? Doesn’t the fact that the TSSI eliminates 
the apparent inconsistencies in Marx’s theory therefore make it a more robust exegetical 
interpretation? N&B make it seem as though logical inconsistency is a good thing.  
Perhaps they meant to argue that it is easier to achieve consistency when one 
relaxes the restrictions imposed on a problem. That is certainly true, but robustness and 
difficulty are two different things. Kepler’s theory of planetary motion is more robust than 
Copernicus’ because it is more consistent with the facts, and it is more consistent with the 
facts because he relaxed the restrictions imposed on the problem – he did not try to force 
planets to move in circles. Or perhaps N&B meant to argue that although Marx’s theory 
is internally consistent when it is understood as a temporal theory, it becomes less robust 
in some other respect. But if this is what they meant, it is hardly an argument, since they 
fail to identify any other respect in which it becomes less robust.  
 
Monopoly Prices and Limits to Monopoly Power 
 
N&B argue that “the labour theory of value requires perfect competition” and that the 
“existence of … power institutions and processes” such as monopolies, oligopolies, and 
government intervention “makes labour values … practically useless for the study of 
actual prices and accumulation” (p. 91). For this and other reasons, “the development of 
capitalism [has] undermined [his] logic” (p. 84).  
But Marx’s value theory simply does not require perfect competition. He 
devoted two hundred pages of Capital to an analysis of land rent and agricultural prices 
that include rent as a component. As Marx (1991, p. 897) noted, “agricultural products 
are always sold at a monopoly price.” This is because a condition that is needed for 
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perfect competition to exist is absent in this case; the scarcity of arable land makes it 
difficult for new suppliers of land to enter the market. 
So the emergence of monopolies and oligopolies as a dominant presence 
throughout the economy has not undermined Marx’s logic. His analysis of monopoly 
price predates this new phenomenon, and monopoly prices (as well as market prices that 
differ from average prices and other prices besides perfectly-competitive ones) can be 
understood in a manner consistent with his value theory. N&B seem to think that prices 
can be “set ‘arbitrarily’ without any necessary link to production prices” if perfect 
competition does not exist (p. 91). Marx was either aware of or anticipated this objection, 
and he responded to it, once again, by making use of his demonstration that capitalists 
cannot create additional profit at the level of the economy as a whole by selling 
commodities for more than they are actually worth: 
 [If] a monopoly price becomes possible …, this does not mean that the limits 
fixed by commodity value are abolished. A monopoly price for certain 
products simply transfers a portion of the profit made by other commodity 
producers to the commodities with the monopoly price. … [it] leaves 
unaffected the limit of surplus-value itself. (Marx 1991, p. 1001) [emphasis 
added] 
The prices of individual products depend and have always depended on a great many 
factors, not only the amount of labour needed to reproduce them. But this does not imply 
that their values are “practically useless for the study of actual prices.” I do not see how 
struggles over intellectual property rights can be fruitfully understood without appealing 
to the principle that commodities’ values are determined by the amount of labour needed 
to reproduce them. This principle certainly does not account for the current prices of 
things like software, but it does account for software owners’ fierce struggle to protect 
their monopoly rights. If the law permitted software to be reproduced freely, its price 
would plummet to almost nothing, because almost no labour is needed to reproduce it 
and thus the cost of reproducing it is negligible.18 
For another example, one of the most significant economic phenomena of our 
time is the dramatic fall in computer prices. The average price of ‘computers and 
peripheral equipment’ declined by 99.99% during the 50 years between 1959 and 2009.19 
Can there be any doubt that this decline is due predominantly to a massive increase in 
productivity, i.e., a massive reduction in the amount of labour needed to reproduce a unit 
of computing power?  
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Falling Rates of Profit and Accumulation Underlying the Great Recession 
 
Computers are an extreme example, but not an isolated one. A decade ago, the orthodox 
Marxist who headed the Federal Reserve noted that  
[F]aster productivity growth keeps a lid on unit costs and prices. Firms 
hesitate to raise prices for fear that their competitors will be able, with 
lower costs from new investments, to wrest market share from them. 
Indeed, the increased availability of labour-displacing equipment and 
software, at declining prices and improving delivery times, is arguably at 
the root of the loss of business pricing power in recent years. (Greenspan, 
2000) 
The “loss of business pricing power” due to “labour-displacing equipment and software” 
is the crux of Marx’s law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit. This law, a crucial pillar 
of his theory of economic crisis, is a direct consequence of his value theory, particularly its 
key propositions that a commodity’s value is determined by the amount of labour needed 
to reproduce it and that aggregate price and profit are equal to aggregate value and 
surplus-value.  
At least in the case of the U.S. (I have not studied other countries), the law of 
the tendential fall in the rate of profit possesses remarkable explanatory power, and it is 
tremendously significant for an understanding of the long-run conditions that set the 
stage for the Great Recession. The chain of causation runs as follows: (1) As I will show 
presently, the law accounts for almost all of the fall in the rate of profit of U.S. 
corporations during the six decades preceding the latest crisis, and (2) the fall in the rate 
of profit fully accounts for the sharp fall in corporations’ rate of accumulation since the 
late 1970s. (3) The fall in the rate of accumulation is in turn the principal cause of the 
chronic slowdown in economic growth. (4) The slowdown in growth, the falling rate of 
profit, and governmental policies intended to ameliorate the effects of, and perhaps 
reverse, the declines in growth and profitability have led to ever-rising debt burdens.20 
And (5) the massive burden of unpaid debt seems to be a crucial determinant of the 
length, severity, and persistent effects of the Great Recession.21 
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Figure 2. The Rate of Profit and the Rate of Accumulation One-Year Later, U.S. 
Corporations 
 
 
 
I cannot document all of these claims here, but points (3) through (5) are not very 
controversial. As for points (1) and (2), let us first look at the relationship between 
corporations’ rate of profit and their rate of accumulation of fixed assets.22 Figure 2 shows 
that the relationship has been a remarkably tight one for four decades. And since 
movements in the rate of profit precede movements in the rate of accumulation by one or 
more years, the fall in the former fully explains the fall in the latter.   
 
Figure 3. Nominal and Adjusted Rates of Profit, U.S. Corporations 
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But why did the rate of profit fall? Well, one factor that can cause it to change is a change 
in income distribution between profits and compensation of employees. Another is a 
change in the relationship between the money and labour-time measures of value. For 
example, when money prices rise in relationship to the amount of labour that is needed to 
reproduce commodities, this will raise the nominal (money) rate of profit. To ascertain 
the impact of these factors, I computed an adjusted rate of profit that holds them 
constant, thereby eliminating them as sources of variation in the rate of profit. As Figure 3 
shows, they had very little effect on its trend in the long run. (Increases in money prices 
relative to labour-time values boosted the level of the nominal rate of profit substantially, 
but they had almost no effect on its long-run trend). Between 1947 and 2007, the 
nominal rate of profit fell by 11.0 percentage points while the adjusted rate fell by 12.3 
points. 
Thus, in order to understand why the rate of profit, the rate of accumulation, 
and the rate of economic growth fell, we have to understand why the adjusted rate of 
profit fell. To understand the mathematical reason why it fell, note that the average age of 
the people in a room has to fall whenever a new person enters the room whose age is less 
than the average age. In the same way, the overall rate of profit has to fall whenever the 
rate of profit on new investments is less than the overall rate. (The rate of profit on new 
investments is the extra profit that results from an extra dollar invested.) Now, as Figure 4 
shows, the adjusted rate of profit on new investments was indeed consistently less than 
the overall adjusted rate of profit. So the overall rate had to fall.   
 
Figure 4. Adjusted Rates of Profit, Overall and on New Investments, U.S. 
Corporations 
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The economic reason why the adjusted rate of profit fell has to do with the fact that the 
adjusted rate on new investments, toward which it tends, is an extremely close proxy for 
the ratio of (a) the growth rate of employment to (b) the share of profit that is 
accumulated, i.e., spent on productive investments (see Kliman, 2011, pp. 132–34 for the 
derivation of this result). Thus, the overall adjusted rate of profit fell because the ratio of 
(a) to (b) was consistently below the current overall adjusted rate. In other words, the 
adjusted rate of profit, and thus the nominal rate of profit, experienced a persistent fall 
because, throughout the entire six decades, employment increased too slowly in 
relationship to the accumulation of capital to allow the existing rate of profit to be 
maintained. This is exactly how Marx’s law explains the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall (Marx, 1991, ch. 15). 
Additional Criticisms 
  
N&B make several other criticisms of Marx in their discussion of his theory of the 
relationship between values and prices. First, while Marx claimed to demonstrate, at the 
start of Capital, that the sole property that commodities have in common is that they are 
products of labour in the abstract, N&B endorse Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s famous 
counterargument that Marx arbitrarily ignored some other possible common properties 
– utility, scarcity, and the commodities’ existence as appropriated things. But Böhm-
Bawerk’s criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the object under investigation. At 
this point in Capital, Marx’s aim was to identify a common property, not to identify the 
factors that enable things to exchange as commodities. “It is quite true that the things 
could not exchange as commodities unless they were scarce, owned, and useful. But none 
of these is a property of the things themselves; all are relations between the things and 
people.  (Although the usefulness of things is dependent on their physical properties, 
usefulness itself is not such a property)” (Kliman, 2000, p. 105).   
 Second, N&B argue that it is not possible to “explain the trajectory of financial 
markets with Marxist tools” (p. 92). It is true, and Marx stressed at length, that there is no 
law of value underlying variations in interest rates. And for this and other reasons, there is 
only a tenuous relationship between commodities’ values and the prices of debt 
instruments. But if the tools that Marx employed count as “Marxist tools,” there is indeed 
a Marxist tool to explain interest-rate variations: the theory (which is not uniquely his) 
that they are determined by changes in the relationship between the supply of and the 
demand for loanable funds (see, e.g., Marx, 1991, p.  488). And the law of value can help 
explain equity-market phenomena such as the relationship between equity prices and 
companies’ profits. As I discussed above, Marx’s theory largely accounts for variations in 
U.S. corporations’ rate of profit, and between 1946 and 2008, the correlation between the 
(before- and after-tax) rates of profit and S&P 500 corporations’ earnings-to-price ratio 
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of the following year was a far-from-negligible 0.595 (see Kliman, 2011, pp. 102–03). 
And Potts (2009, 2011) has employed Marx’s concept of ‘surplus capital’ in order to 
argue that asset bubbles form partly because investment in financial instruments may 
tend to increase when a fall in the rate of profit depresses productive investment. 
In any case, I do not see that the relative absence of ‘Marxist tools’ to explain 
financial phenomena is due to any inherent defect in his theories. If there are few such 
tools today, it is because Marx died before he could develop them – he noted in Capital 
that thorough analyses of credit markets and competition in the world market were 
“outside the scope of this work … they belong to a possible continuation” (Marx, 1991, p. 
205) – and because mainstream “Marxian economists,” who are staunch opponents of 
his work, have not wanted to develop them. 
Third, N&B claim that Paul Samuelson ‘demonstrated’ that the 
transformation of values into prices of production is ‘pointless.’ Prices of production can 
be deduced directly from “real” data – physical input and outputs and real wages – 
“without any intermediate resort to labour values” (p. 100). But Samuelson 
demonstrated no such thing about Marx’s transformation of values into prices of 
production. He showed that values are not needed in order to deduce the ‘prices of 
production’ of the simultaneous dual-system revisions (‘corrections’) of Marx. The 
“redundancy” of value is purely a consequence of simultaneous valuation. If prices and 
values are determined temporally, physical data are not the only proximate determinants 
of relative prices or values (see Kliman, 2007, ch. 5, esp. pp. 79–81). 
 Finally, N&B argue that Michio Morishima and Ian Steedman demonstrated 
that “there is nothing inherent in joint production to guarantee” that commodities’ values 
are positive rather than negative, a result that is “potentially devastating for the labour 
theory of value” (p. 101). But if wool and mutton are only produced jointly, neither of 
them has a value on its own. The value of a commodity is determined by the amount of 
labour needed to reproduce it, and in this case we cannot say how much labour is needed 
to reproduce either wool or mutton on its own. The very notion is meaningless. What has 
a value is the joint product. Kliman and McGlone (1999, pp. 45-48) provide a temporal 
single-system account of the determination of joint products’ values and prices. Their 
values cannot be negative, and all of Marx’s aggregate value-price equalities are preserved. 
 
C. Labour 
 
Productive and Unproductive Labour 
 
A whole chapter of Capital as Power is devoted to a critique of “the Marxist” distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour. But almost all of it is a critique of various 
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post-Marx Marxists’ writings on the topic. N&B have extremely little to say about Marx’s 
own distinction between productive and unproductive labour – which is quite surprising, 
given that hundreds of pages of his economic writings are devoted to it.  
 Marx is of course not responsible for what post-Marx Marxists have said, and I 
have no desire to take responsibility either. My response will therefore be limited to a 
discussion of the few things N&B say that have a bearing on Marx’s own distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour. 
 Their only critique of Marx’s distinction is the critical remark they make about 
his statement that an act of labour is productive only if it is “directly consumed in the 
course of production for the valorization of capital” (p. 120; from Marx, 1990b, p. 1038) 
[emphasis omitted]. On their interpretation, this means that the act of labour must be 
“tied to capital through the wage contract.” And the problem with Marx’s statement, they 
write, is that “even if we accept that capitalist control is a prerequisite for the creation of 
value, it is not clear why the only gauge for such control is the wage contract” (p. 120). 
But “tied to capital through the wage contract” – which is not even an adequate 
rendering of “directly exchanged with capital,” another condition that must be satisfied in 
order for labour to be productive – has little, if anything, to do with “directly consumed in 
the course of production for the valorization of capital.” Marx uses the phrase “directly 
consumed in the course of production” to distinguish between (a) human activity that is 
part of a particular act of production and (b) human activity that –  no matter how much 
it facilitates that act of production and no matter how necessary it may be for that act of 
production to take place – is not part of it. Activity (a) is productive if it also valorizes 
capital, i.e., creates surplus-value, while activity (b) is necessarily unproductive.  
To understand this more clearly, consider the objection of Pellegrino Rossi to 
Adam Smith’s distinction between productive and unproductive labour. Smith held that 
the labour of a magistrate is unproductive. Rossi argued against this that the magistrate’s 
labour is indirectly productive. Other acts of production are almost impossible without it. 
His labour therefore “contributes to [other acts of production], if not by direct and 
material co-operation, at least by an indirect action which cannot be left out of account” 
(quoted in Marx, 1989, p. 190). Marx did not dispute the fact that it contributes in this 
manner, but he nonetheless rejected Rossi’s attempt to efface the distinction between 
productive and unproductive labour: “It is precisely this labour which participates 
indirectly in production (and it forms only a part of unproductive labour) that we call 
unproductive labour. Otherwise we would have to say that since the magistrate is 
absolutely unable to live without the peasant, therefore the peasant is an indirect 
producer of justice. And so on. Utter nonsense!” (Marx, 1989, p. 190). 
The following example will help to illustrate why the distinction between direct 
and indirect participation in production is crucial. Every workday, workers in some 
company directly create $1000 of surplus-value. The manager puts the $1000 in a box in 
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his office. But every day, one worker breaks into the office, takes the $1000, and pockets it. 
So the company hires a guard to prevent her from doing so. Because it has to pay the 
guard $100, the profit it keeps for itself is $900, which is less than the total surplus-value, 
but much more than the $0 profit it wound up with when the thefts were occurring. So 
the guard indirectly contributes to the company’s profit; indeed, if the company is to 
wind up with any profit at all, his labour is absolutely necessary. But the $1000 exists 
whether or not he shows up to work, so he does not directly create the surplus-value. To 
the contrary, the $100 he receives deprives the company of one-tenth of it. 
 The reason why I have belaboured the distinction between direct production 
and indirect participation in production is that N&B are either unfamiliar with it or, for 
some reason they do not explain, choose not to respect it. They repeatedly try to efface 
the distinction between productive and unproductive labour on the grounds that some 
activity that has been classified as unproductive contributes indirectly to the production 
of surplus-value. For instance, they try to complicate the issue by noting that, although 
financial intermediation is often classified as unproductive activity, it “help[s] guide 
reproduction” (p. 112). Employees of insurance companies do work that “serve[s] to 
provide stability for production” (p. 113). And don’t “government taxation, expenditures 
and subsidies, the legal code and the organized use of violence” “affect exchange values 
and surplus-values?” (p. 119). Yes; but they don’t directly create them. 
 The point of these efforts to complicate matters is to argue, first, that the 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour is irredeemably fuzzy. And 
second, since Marx’s value theory cannot do without the distinction, it is likewise 
irredeemably fuzzy and must be abandoned.23 But it is N&B who are making them fuzzy, 
by ignoring the clear distinction between the direct creation of surplus-value and indirect 
contributions to its creation. 
 
Abstract and Concrete Labour, Simple and Complex Labour 
 
The term abstract labour refers to homogeneous labour, labour as such, in contrast to the 
variety of heterogenous concrete labours (waiting tables, truck-driving, etc.). In Marx’s 
theory, abstract labour creates value, wealth in the abstract, while concrete labour 
produces use-values, useful material products and effects. But, N&B charge, “No one, 
from Marx onward, has been able to measure the unit of abstract labour,” so “Marxists do 
not even know what abstract labour looks like” (p. 143, p. 107). Consequently, the theory 
that the amount of abstract labour needed to reproduce commodities determines their 
values and aggregate prices is rubbish.  
Actually, it was quite clear to Marx what abstract labour “looks like,” because it is 
real work. And because it is real work, it is “measured in terms of time”: 
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The work is not done twice over, once to produce a suitable product, a use-value, to 
transform the means of production into products, and a second time to generate 
value and surplus-value, to valorize value. ... All that is contributed is the labour of 
spinning, and so on, and through this contribution more yarn is continually 
produced. This real work creates value only if it is performed at a normally defined 
rate of intensity ...  and if this real work of given intensity and of given quantity as 
measured in terms of time actually materializes as a product. (Marx, 1990b, pp. 
991–992) 
So Marx resolved the problem that N&B pose by noting that “the work is not done twice 
over.”  Their claim that “Marxist political economy lack[s] a basic unit” (p. 7) is simply 
incorrect. 
But N&B, who are evidently unaware of the manner in which Marx actually 
specified the unit of abstract labour, write that “Marx resolves this problem, almost in 
passing, by resorting to another distinction – one that he makes between skilled labour 
and unskilled, or simple, labour” (p. 139). (An hour of skilled (or complex) labour counts 
as a multiple of an hour of unskilled labour; if it counts as double, it creates twice as much 
value.) N&B say that this latter way of specifying the unit of abstract labour is “difficult to 
accept” because “[t]he very parity between abstract and unskilled labour seems to 
contradict Marx’s most basic assumption. For Marx, skilled and unskilled labour are two 
types of concrete labour whose characteristics belong to the qualitative realm of use 
value” (p. 139).  
But Marx did not specify the unit of abstract labour in this way, and it cannot 
properly be specified in this way. That is because, contrary to what N&B assert, skilled 
and unskilled labour are both abstract labour. Hence, the unit of abstract labour must 
already be identified before an hour of skilled labour can be counted as a multiple of 
unskilled labour.  
When we refer to simple and complex labour, we do not refer to simple 
weaving-labour or complex tailoring-labour, and so on, but to simple and 
complex labour-as-such. The commensuration of labours that produce 
different use-values is already presupposed. …  
Complex labour can be compared to, and thus reduced to a multiple of, simple 
labour, only because they lack any qualitative difference, i.e., only because both 
are abstract labour. As Marx [1990a, pp. 140–41] noted, ‘the magnitudes of 
different things only become comparable in quantitative terms when they have 
been reduced to the same unit’. 
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… When … we consider doctoring-labour and janitoring-labour as labours of 
different kinds, it is meaningless to ask whether one is more skilled or complex 
than the other. Like can only be compared with like. 
To compare the relative complexity of these two labours, their qualitative 
differences must thus be set aside. (McGlone and Kliman 2004, pp. 138–39) 
The upshot of all this is that, even if it were impossible to reduce complex labour to a 
multiple of simple labour, Marxist political economy would still not lack a basic unit, 
because the basic unit—a unit of real work, measured in terms of time—is specified 
independently of and prior to the reduction of complex labour to simple labour.  
Not surprisingly, N&B doubt whether complex labour can be reduced to a 
multiple of simple labour:    
 
Now, skilled labour supposedly creates more value than unskilled labour, and 
the question is how much more? … 
 
Marx answered the question from the output side, by pointing to the greater 
‘physical productivity’ of skilled labour. His solution, though, is both circular 
and incomplete. It is circular insofar as physical productivity can be compared 
across different commodities only by resorting to prices and wages. (p. 142)  
 
I simply do not know what they are referring to here, and they provide no citation. Marx’s 
actual answer was completely different:  
 
All labour of a higher, or more complicated, character than average labour is 
expenditure of labour-power of a more costly kind, labour-power whose 
production has cost more time and labour than unskilled or simple labour-
power, and which therefore has a higher value. This power being of a higher 
value, it expresses itself in labour of a higher sort, and therefore becomes 
objectified, during an equal amount of time, in proportionately higher values. 
(Marx, 1990a, p. 305) 
 
Thus, if the cost of reproducing the ability to do engineering work, when divided by the 
average number of hours an engineer works during his life, is $40, while the hourly cost of 
reproducing the ability to perform simple tasks is $10, then $40 and $10 are the hourly 
values of these two different kinds of labour-power, and the amount of value created 
during an hour of engineering work is likewise four times the amount of value created 
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during an hour spent performing simple tasks. If, for instance, an hour of simple labour 
creates $20 of new value, then an hour of engineering work creates $80 of new value. 
Notice that nothing in this answer appeals to the wages of the engineer or the regular 
worker.  
The answer does appeal implicitly to prices, such as tuition at engineering 
schools, since the tuition forms part of the cost of reproducing the ability to do 
engineering work. But the answer is not circular because, in Marx’s theory and in the 
temporal single-system interpretation of the theory, causation follows the arrow of time. 
The price paid for the output, the product or service that the engineer provides, is 
determined by, but not a determinant of, the amount of value an hour of his work creates. 
But why does an hour of his work create four times as much value as an hour of 
simple labour? Why not twice as much, or 50% more, or any other number?  As I 
discussed earlier in this paper, N&B claim that “Marx nowhere explains why the 
additional value-creating capacity of skilled labour should bear any particular relationship 
to the labour cost of acquiring the skill” (p. 142). And this is why they regard his answer as 
incomplete. But he does explain why, in the final sentence of the passage I just quoted.  
It can be explained in another way as well: self-interested behavior by 
companies and workers will induce changes in the cost of reproducing engineering 
labour-power that tend to bring about the proportionality to which Marx referred. 
Assume that an hour of the engineer’s work creates only 50% more value than an hour of 
simple labour, i.e., $30. Firms would not hire engineers unless they could pay them less 
than $30 an hour. But if they did so, engineers wouldn’t recoup the cost of going to 
engineering school, since $30 is much less than the $40 needed to reproduce engineering 
labour-power. So the supply of engineers would quickly evaporate.24 If that doesn’t occur, 
we can infer that an hour of engineering work creates more than 50% additional value.   
 But what if an hour of engineering work creates, say, 3.5 times as much value as 
an hour of simple labour, $70? Well, if we assume that people who perform simple labour 
are paid the value of their labour-power, $10, then, unless engineers’ hourly pay is $35 an 
hour or less, firms still get a bigger bang for the buck by hiring people to do simple labour. 
The ratio of the value created by simple labour to the hourly wage of a simple labourer is 
$20/$10 = 2, while the ratio of the value created by an hour of engineering work to the 
hourly pay of an engineer is less than 2 if they are paid more than $35 an hour. What 
would tend to happen, then, is that the demand for engineers would decline, and thus the 
supply of engineering students would decline. More costly engineering schools would 
shut down. Since those that continued to operate would be cheaper, the cost of 
reproducing engineering labour-power would fall. It if fell from $40 to $35, the result 
would be that the cost of reproducing engineering labour-power would be 3.5 times the 
cost of reproducing simple labour-power, $10, and the amount of new value created by 
an hour of engineering labour, $70, would be 3.5 times the amount of new value created 
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by an hour of simple labour. Marx’s proportionality would hold true exactly.  
Of course, the real world does not function in such a neat and frictionless 
manner, but it seems likely that Marx’s proportionality is a serviceable approximation to 
what occurs in the world of appearances, and the best one available. It is certainly not the 
arbitrary stipulation that N&B suggest it is. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that Bichler and Nitzan have not provided us with good reasons to 
accept that belief in capitalism’s eternality is crucial to its continued existence, or that 
capitalists do normally believe that the system is eternal, or that they have come to fear its 
demise. The paper has also sketched out an alternative approach to questions of 
economic crisis and the future of capitalism rooted in Marx’s value theory, in the course 
of defending that theory against their charges that it is logically unsound and that the 
development of capitalism since Marx’s death has undermined his logic. By showing that 
none of Bichler and Nitzan’s charges holds water, it has eliminated their main 
justifications for their claim that their “capital as power” theory is needed as an alternative 
to Marx’s theory.  
Charges that his value theory is logically unsound serve to disqualify it at the 
starting gate, depriving it of the opportunity to demonstrate its explanatory power 
empirically. In contrast, my response to Bichler and Nitzan’s work, while quite critical, has 
not tried to disqualify their theory at the starting gate, on a priori logical grounds, 
irrespective of empirical evidence. They are entitled to their theory. Marx is also entitled 
to his.  
 
Notes
 
1 They interpret a strong influence of current profits on share prices as evidence that 
investors are acting on the basis of the current situation, having abandoned their 
supposedly normal “conviction” that the shares will yield returns ad infinitum because 
capitalism is eternal. 
2 An internally inconsistent theory may happen by accident to hit upon correct 
conclusions, but the arguments it provides in support of these conclusions are always 
invalid. 
3 The correlation was negative between February 1961 and May 1964. If we count this as 
a distinct period and shorten periods 4 and 5 accordingly, the correlations during these 
periods increase to 0.92 and 0.82. 
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4 I computed a correlation of 0.65 for period 7, while B&N report a correlation of 0.64. 
My other results match theirs, so this slight discrepancy may be due to a recent revision 
of the data set. 
5 Since I, like B&N, computed the correlations between 3-year average values, periods 4 
and 5 use data from August 1950 through December 1973, which is almost exactly 
coextensive with the golden age as defined by Skidelsky (2010, p. 24) – the period 
“from 1951 to 1973.”  
6 In some experiments, shares pay a fixed dividend. In others, participants are told what 
the possible dividends are and the probabilities that each will be paid.  
7 As William James (1890, p. 163, emphasis omitted) noted, “the distinction … between 
the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state … is the sovereign means 
for believing what one likes in psychology and of turning what might become a science 
into a tumbling ground for whimsies.” 
8 When I cite page numbers below, but no authors or dates, I am referring to this book.  
9 The TSSI differs from the standard (simultaneous dual-system) interpretation, which 
creates the inconsistencies that are attributed to Marx, in two simple respects. First, it 
holds that Marx understood values and prices to be determined temporally, which 
means that the values and prices of inputs can differ from the values and prices of 
outputs. Second, it holds that he understood value and price magnitudes to be 
determined interdependently. For instance, the sum of capital value invested depends 
on the prices of the means of production that are purchased, while the total price of 
output depends on the amount of new value created by living labour. See Kliman 
(2007) for further discussion. 
10 They thus veer dangerously close to the postmodernism that they excoriate elsewhere 
(see, e.g., p. 2 n1). 
11 In Marx’s theory, a commodity’s value is determined exclusively by the average amount 
of labour needed to reproduce it. 
12 Since the TSSI does not try to show that Marx’s theory is true, it is actually irrelevant 
whether temporal valuation is the right “method to use.” The only relevant issues are 
whether he himself employed temporal valuation and whether his theory becomes 
internally consistent when it is interpreted as a temporal (and single-system) theory.  
13 They write that TSSI authors’ “purpose is to show that [Marx’s] framework is logically 
consistent and fully in agreement with his analytical claims. But in the process of 
achieving this purpose, they seem to have shifted into reverse” (p. 109, emphasis 
added).  
14 In a certain sense, this is so; they are “converted” by means of the quotidian procedure, 
which Marx analyzed in chapter 1 of Capital, of expressing how much a product of 
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labour is worth in terms of ounces of gold, dollars, etc., instead of in terms of labour-
hours. But N&B are referring to a distinct, analytical operation. 
15 They and I agree that it is “logically inconsistent and plagued by insoluble problems” (p. 
106) if it is not understood as a single-system theory. 
16 The value of each branch’s output is the sum of the value transferred from used-up 
means of production and the new value added by living labour. Because the example is 
too simple to illustrate the determination of the value transferred from used-up means 
of production, the relationship between the labour-time and money measures of value 
added, or output prices, I selected the magnitudes of these variables (and the amounts 
of value-creating living labour that are performed) arbitrarily. Thus the output prices 
could be prices of production, competitive market prices, monopoly prices, etc. The 
values and prices of output are in real rather than nominal terms—i.e., they are 
adjusted for any changes in the relationship between labour-time and money 
magnitudes that take place during the period—though Marx’s aggregate equalities 
hold true under the TSSI for nominal value and price variables as well. For further 
discussion of the temporal single-system interpretation of Marx’s account of the 
transformation of value into prices of production, see chs. 8 and 9 of Kliman 2007, esp. 
pp. 164–66. For further discussion of how the relationship between the labour-time 
and money measures of value is determined, see esp. pp. 185–89 of that work. 
17 I am referring here to the real magnitudes of these variables (see note 16 above). Their 
nominal levels are determined in a more complex manner. 
18 Potts (2007) explains that research and development expenditures do not augment 
commodities’ values, and he argues that this is why capitalists seek patents. 
19 My source is National Income and Product Accounts table 1.5.4, line 32, available from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis at bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp. 
20 For example, the ratio of U.S. Treasury debt to GDP increased by 71% between 1970 
and 2007, but it would have declined by 19% if corporate income taxes had not fallen 
as a share of GDP. These taxes fell as a share of GDP partly because the rate of profit 
fell––there was relatively less corporate income to tax––and partly because the 
government shifted much of the effect of falling profitability from corporations to the 
public at large by lowering corporate income tax rates. For further discussion of this 
issue, see Kliman 2011, pp. 55–57. 
21 “These broader problems of debt and deleveraging arguably explain why the successful 
stabilization of the financial industry has done no more than pull the economy back 
from the brink, without producing a strong recovery. The economy is hamstrung—
still crippled by a debt overhang” (Krugman and Wells, 2010). 
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22 Accumulation of fixed assets means investment in equipment and software, and 
spending to construct factories, office buildings, and other “structures.” The numerator 
of the rate of profit shown in Figure 2 is corporations’ net output (net value added) 
minus compensation (wages, salaries, and benefits) of employees. The numerator of 
the rate of accumulation is corporations’ net investment in fixed assets. The 
denominator of both rates is the net stock of fixed assets. All variables are valued at 
historical cost, and all data used to compute these variables and the derivative variables 
shown in Figures 3 and 4 come from the U.S. government. For further discussion of 
my data sources and computations, see Kliman 2011, chs. 5 and 7.  
23 See, e.g., their remarks about the distinction between capitalist production and other 
forms of social reproduction on p. 121. 
24 I am assuming here that the government does not subsidize their education. All else 
being equal, the subsidy is a wasted expenditure from the vantage point of a 
government interested in augmenting value, since engineering work doesn’t “pay for 
itself” (i.e., create more value than the engineers receive once the subsidy is factored 
in). 
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Kliman on Systemic Fear:  
A Rejoinder 
 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
 
Editors’ Note: Andrew Kliman’s paper in this issue, ‘Value and Crisis: Bichler and Nitzan 
versus Marx’, consists of two sections. The first section deals with Bichler and Nitzan’s 
recent paper on ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (2010). 
The second section takes issue with their earlier critique of Marx’s labour theory of value 
(Nitzan and Bichler, 2009a), and offers an explanation of the global economic crisis. In 
the following rejoinder, Bichler and Nitzan address the points raised in the first of these 
sections.  
 
Introduction 
 
The first part of Kliman’s paper isn’t exactly a critique. The author doesn’t engage our 
argument, and he shows no concern for the broader theoretical and historical context in 
which this argument is made. Instead, he looks for inconsistencies, discrepancies and 
incompatibilities – faults that in his view pull the rug out from under our entire analysis 
and make such engagement unnecessary to begin with. The gist of his complaint can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
1. Bichler and Nitzan, he argues, draw conclusions that their own data refute. In their 
2010 article they claim that, in capitalism, systemic fear is revealed solely by the 
breakdown of capitalisation (with stock prices being positively and tightly 
correlated with current earnings). They then argue that such a breakdown occurred 
only during the 1930s and 2000s, and use this observation to infer that capitalists 
have been gripped by systemic fear during these periods. However, according to the 
evidence that they themselves marshal, a positive and tight correlation also existed 
from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. And since the latter period wasn’t one of 
crisis – in fact, it is commonly seen as the ‘golden age’ of capitalism – the notion that 
price-earnings correlations are indicative of systemic fear breaks down. 
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2. Bichler and Nitzan erroneously assume that capitalism requires capitalists to believe 
that the system will continue forever. The error here is both logical and empirical. 
Simple probability theory suggests that, for a high enough reward, most people will 
invest even when they believe that the capitalist system is very likely to collapse. And 
laboratory experiments, including those reported by Nobel laureates, show that 
people will continue to buy stocks that they know will become worthless by the end 
of the experiment. In other words, capitalists act like capitalists regardless of what 
they think about the future of capitalism. 
 
3. The very notion of systemic fear is entirely subjective and therefore useless for a 
scientific inquiry. Bichler and Nitzan pretend to show that capital is a historical 
subject capable of bringing capitalism down, but their alleged demonstration relies 
on incoherent terminology and unfalsifiable Freudian speculations. Instead, they 
should go back to the ‘good old fear’ that capitalists feel when struck by a real crisis 
of real profit (as Marx already and perfectly explains in Das Kapital). 
 
The Sleepwalkers 
 
Kliman’s first point is correct, and we are grateful to him for having pointed it out to us. 
The positive correlation between share prices and current earnings indeed is not unique 
to the 1930s and 2000s. As he indicates, a similar correlation exists from the early 1950s 
to the early 1970s – a correlation that we overlooked and failed to mention in our paper. 
However, as this rejoinder shall show, the oversight is hardly critical. It can be easily 
corrected in a manner consistent with both our systemic-fear hypothesis and our broader 
notion of the capitalist mode of power. 
To begin with, Kliman’s personal anxieties notwithstanding, inconsistency 
need not be lethal. Note that we are dealing here not with a heteronomous dogma, but 
with the autonomous, living process of an ever-changing science.1 And scientific 
discovery, unlike religious reiteration of eternal truths, is littered with oversights and 
errors. They are the bread and butter of the creative process, the serendipitous leeway 
that gives scientists the ability to tease order out of chaos. For academics concerned with 
the health of their career, errors are a recipe for disaster – a risk best avoided by limiting 
oneself to ‘adoptions’, ‘interpretations’ and ‘critiques’. But for creative scientists, making 
errors – and negating them – is the only path to breakthroughs. 
The Pythagoreans erred in their belief that every magnitude can be expressed 
as a rational number. This erroneous conviction, though, helped launch the remarkable 
triangle of democracy-science-philosophy, and the eventual refutation of that conviction 
created a much larger mathematics that incorporated irrational as well as rational 
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numbers. And the list continues. Kepler’s astronomical research was bogged down for a 
decade by his supposition that celestial orbits were circular rather than elliptical, but that 
mistake sharpened his inquiry and hardly invalidated his broader thesis. Delambre and 
Méchain’s mission to measure the standard meter was full of baffling inaccuracies, but 
those inaccuracies helped trigger the mathematical development of statistical estimates. 
Einstein’s belief in a stationary universe didn’t sit well with his relativity theory, creating 
an inconsistency that he solved by inventing a ‘cosmological constant’; later on, when he 
accepted that the universe was expanding, the inconsistency disappeared and the 
constant became unnecessary (erroneous?); and nowadays, talk of an accelerating 
universe may end up giving the constant yet another lease on life. The works of Gardiner 
Means on administered prices and on the separation of corporate control from 
ownership, although subject to intense empirical criticism, remain two of the most fruitful 
starting points in twentieth-century economics.2 Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem took seven years to produce, only to be found fatally flawed. But two years later, 
the error was corrected, the proof was accepted, and mathematics benefitted from novel 
hypotheses and new areas of inquiry that Wiles’ torturous journey helped open up. 
Yutaka Taniyama, one of the greatest sleepwalkers of modern mathematics, was 
described by his collabourator Guro Shimura as sloppy to the point of laziness: “He was 
gifted with the special capability of making many mistakes, mostly in the right direction. I 
envied him for this and tried in vain to imitate him, but found it quite difficult to make 
good mistakes” (quoted in Singh, 1997, p. 174). This willingness to go astray enabled 
Taniyama to come up with a most fantastic conjecture on the symmetry between 
modular forms and elliptical equations, a conjecture that opened up multiple new 
mathematical horizons well before it was finally proven.3  
We, too, sleepwalked. Our concern was systemic fear and systemic crisis, not 
‘business as usual’. We wanted to understand what happens not when capitalists are sure 
of their rule, but when they lose their confidence. We wanted to know how they act not 
when capitalism seems certain, but when it is put into question. And so we overlooked 
what in retrospect seems obvious. 
 
The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalisation and the Stock 
Market 
 
Kliman clings to a technical oversight, presenting it as a ‘make-or-break’ error for our 
broader argument. But by ignoring the argument itself and the overall framework in 
which it is developed, he ends up with a misleading caricature. 
So let us reiterate the broad picture, if only in outline, and in the process try to 
clarify our argument and put things right. Our focus on the twin notion of systemic fear 
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and systemic crisis didn’t come out of the blue. It emerged as part of a new approach to 
capitalism – an approach that offers an alternative to both neoclassical and Marxian 
political economies, and that we have articulated in many articles and books, including 
our recent Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009a). In 2008, we began to write a 
paper series on the ‘Contours of Crisis’; a series that we hope to continue and eventually 
develop into a book (Bichler and Nitzan, 2008, 2009; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009b). The 
article ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism‘ (Bichler and 
Nitzan, 2010) is an expanded version of the third installment in that series. The series 
introduces and develops the notions of systemic crisis and systemic fear – but it does so 
in steps, gradually rearticulating and refining the terms as the story continues to unfold.  
Mainstream and Marxist political economies see capitalism as a mode of 
production and/or consumption. Consequently, they both adhere to a double separation 
– one between politics and economics; and another between the so-called real and 
nominal spheres of the economy itself.4 In this framework, the nominal sphere of money, 
credit and finance is merely a mirror – accurate for the neoclassicals, distortive for the 
Marxists – of the underlying ‘economic reality’. From this viewpoint, the only true crises 
are ‘real’ ones: crises of employment, production and consumption; crises of real 
profitability; crises of real accumulation, crisis of real investment, etc. These crises can be 
trigged by many causes, including government intervention, natural disaster, war, and, of 
course, finance. But whatever their origins, they become meaningful only insofar as they 
materialise in the underlying ‘reality’ of the economy. 
Our framework is very different. Capitalism is not a mode of production and 
consumption, but a mode of power. To understand it, we start not from the narrow 
‘material’ sphere of economics, but from the broad architecture of social power. And even 
when we deal with so-called economic processes, we focus not on productivity and well-
being, but on the power to control productivity and well-being. In this framework, capital 
is not a technological/productive entity that is merely ‘reflected’ in finance. It is not 
machines, structures and work in progess, but a pure quantitative code of power. And that 
code is financial and only financial.  
The central and by now all-pervasive algorithm of the capitalist mode of power 
is capitalisation: the discounting to present value of risk-adjusted expected future income. 
This is the ritual that constantly creorders – or creates the order – of capitalism’s power 
institutions and process. Over the past century, capitalisation has expanded to encompass 
numerous aspects of social life – from the mindset and genetic code of individuals, to 
social organisations and institutions, and even the ecological future of humanity. But the 
most distilled and perfected form of capitalisation remains the stock market. This is the 
chief symbolic barometer of the capitalist outlook; it is the mechanism through which 
capitalists increasingly organise their world of strategic sabotage and differential 
accumulation; and it is the main yardstick with which they gauge their success and failure. 
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Major Bear Markets 
 
Systemic crisis is one that threatens the very future of capitalism. The first necessary 
feature of such a crisis is the existence of a major bear market. That was the starting point 
of our paper series. In ‘Contours of Crisis: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ (Bichler and 
Nitzan, 2008), we explained what we mean by such crises, identified their occurrence in 
the United States, characterised their main features, and speculated about their 
relationship to broad societal transformations.  
Since there is no agreed-upon definition for a bear market – let alone a ‘major’ 
one – we devised our own:  
 
A major bear market denotes a multi-year period during which: (1) the 
10-year centred moving average of stock prices, expressed in constant 
dollars, trends downward; and (2) each successive sub-peak of the 
underlying price series, expressed in constant dollars, is lower than the 
previous one.5 
 
The reason for expressing stock prices in ‘constant dollars’ is that the capitalist outlook is 
always differential. Modern capitalists do not seek simply to increase their dollar assets, 
but to increase them faster than the assets of others. Now, one of the most basic 
benchmarks for such comparisons is the standard basket of consumer goods and services. 
If the price of equities rises faster than the price of that basket, equity price inflation ends 
up being higher than overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation; the so-called 
‘constant dollar’ price of equities increases; and equity owners end up doing better than 
the average basket owner.6 (Of course, beating CPI inflation is merely the first step in a 
long sequence, whose ultimate achievement is beating the increase of every existing 
basket, but these further steps need not concern us here.) 
According to the above definition, over the past two centuries, the United 
States has experienced six major bear markets. These periods are marked by the grey 
areas in Figure 1 and are listed in Table 1, along with the cumulative declines in stock 
prices. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars 
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas indicate major bear markets, as defined in the text and in Table 1. 
The U.S. stock price index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, 
insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the 
Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-
1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant dollar series is computed by 
dividing the stock price index by the Consumer Price Index. The last data point is for 
2010. Data are rebased with 1929=100.0 
  
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock prices; CPUSA for 
consumer prices); Standard and Poor’s through Global Insight (series codes: 
SP500@40.D7 and SP500.D7 for stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series 
code: L64@C111 for consumer prices). 
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Table 1 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* 
(constant-dollar calculations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The most recent sub-trough of the current major bear market occurred in 2008. 
It is not yet clear whether this sub-trough marks the end of this bear market. 
 
* A major bear market is defined as a multiyear period during which: (1) the 10-year 
centred moving average of stock prices, expressed in constant dollars, trends downward; 
and (2) each successive sub-peak of the underlying price series, expressed in constant 
dollars, is lower than the previous one.  
 
** The peak occurs one year prior to the onset of a major bear market. 
 
Clearly, the 1950s and 1960s did not fulfill this first criterion of a systemic crisis: there was 
no bear market, let alone a major one. Although much of the emphasis during that period, 
epitomised in the triumphalist books of John Kenneth Galbraith (1958; 1967), was on 
the rising welfare-warfare state, the self-financing ability of the leading industrial 
corporations and the alleged demise of finance, the stock market actually boomed – and 
at growth rates that would make today’s neoliberals envious. Capitalism was not in crisis, 
and capitalists certainly had no reason to fear for its future. That is obvious enough. 
 
Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations 
 
Now, ‘Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ wasn’t merely technical (Bichler and Nitzan, 
2008). It further argued that the long-term ups and downs of the stock market, no matter 
how stylised and patterned, are not self-generating. They don’t just happen on their own. 
PERIOD DECLINE FROM PEAK 
TO TROUGH (%) ** 
1835–1842 –50% 
1851–1857 –62% 
1906–1920 –70% 
1929–1948 –56% 
1969–1981 –55% 
2000–2010   –50% 
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Each of them has a reason, and that reason is deeply social and historically unique. Note 
that, during the twentieth century, every oscillation from a major bear market to a bull 
market was accompanied by a systemic societal transformation: 
 
 The crisis of 1906–1920 marked the closing of the American Frontier, the shift from 
robber-baron capitalism to large-scale business enterprise, and the beginning of 
synchronised finance.  
 
 The crisis of 1929–1948 signaled the end of ‘unregulated’ capitalism, and the 
emergence of large governments and the welfare-warfare state. 
 
 The crisis of 1969–1981 marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the resumption of 
worldwide capital flows and the onset of neoliberal globalisation. 
 
Moreover, the article pointed out that none of these transformations were ‘in the cards’. 
Most observers in the 1900s didn’t expect managerial capitalism to take hold; few in the 
1920s anticipated the welfare-warfare state; and not too many in the 1960s predicted 
neoliberal regulation. All three transformations involved a complex set of conflicts; their 
trajectories were fuzzy, and their outcomes were all but impossible to anticipate. 
In other words, underneath the seemingly oscillating long-term patterns of the 
market lies an open-ended and inherently unpredictable creordering of the entire 
political economy. Although past bear markets have always given way to long bull runs, 
these transitions were never automatic. Each and every one of them reflected a profound 
transformation of the underlying societal structure. This quantitative-qualitative 
correspondence, we noted, still holds. In order for the current crisis to end and a new 
long-term upswing to begin, the social structure must be transformed, and the key aspect 
of that transformation is the creordering of capitalist power. 
 
The Capitalist Mode of Power: Approaching the Glass Ceiling 
 
While systemic crisis is always accompanied by a major bear market transformation, the 
reverse is not necessarily true: a major bear market does not have to be associated with 
systemic crisis. Systemic crises are ones that threaten the very future of capitalism, and 
these threats arise only when capitalist power approaches a glass ceiling and it becomes 
difficult if not impossible for capitalist power to increase under existing circumstances. 
These conditions are fairly rare, and they need not exist – and usually do not exist – in 
every major bear market. 
How do we know that capitalist power is approaching its glass ceiling? The 
answer begins with the nature of capitalist power. Private ownership is created, 
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augmented and protected through organised exclusion, and organised exclusion is always 
a matter of power: it requires strategic sabotage and the threat and occasional use of force. 
Now, capitalism is historically unique in that everything that can be owned can be priced. 
And since ownership is based on power, relative prices quantify the relative power of 
owners: the greater the relative magnitude of the owned assets, the greater the power of 
their owner. In this sense, capitalism is deeply differential, and that differentiality is not 
static, but dynamic. Caught in a never-ending power struggle, capitalists are compelled to 
think of accumulation not absolutely, but relatively. They seek not to meet the average, 
but to beat it; not to keep their distributive share, but to raise it; not to run with the herd, 
but to butt ahead of it. 
As we indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’, though, power is deeply dialectical. As an 
institution of power, private ownership is inherently conflictual: it requires organised 
exclusion, strategic sabotage and the differential exercise of force. And since capitalists are 
conditioned to accumulate differentially, their quest for further redistribution forces them 
to exclude more, inflict greater sabotage and increase the dose of force. But there is a 
built-in limit: no single capitalist or group of capitalists can ever own more than what 
there is to own. So from a certain point onward, further forceful redistribution is bound to 
run into mounting resistance; it gradually grows more difficult to achieve; and, eventually, 
it reaches its own envelope and becomes impossible to sustain. 
This is the glass ceiling, the elusive yet imposing point of hubris to which we 
alluded in ‘Systemic Fear’. It is the societal point where the rulers, having reached their 
maximum power, seem completely confident in the obedience of the ruled. And it is the 
point from which their power and confidence has no where to go but down.  
Have U.S. capitalists reached this point of hubris? In the second part of 
‘Systemic Fear’, we noted that much of the postwar increase in stock prices was 
accounted for by the self-reinforcing convergence of redistributional power processes. 
During that period, there was a rise in the gross profit and interest share of capitalists in 
national income; a drop in effective corporate tax rates; a decline of profit volatility that 
reduced risk perceptions; and, since the early 1980s, a fall in the rate of interest that 
boosted corporate profit relative to interest payments and lowered the discount rate. 
Now, since these processes are self-exhaustive, the question is: at what point do they 
become impossible to maintain, and how far is the U.S. political economy from reaching 
that point?  
One quick way to address this question is to examine the size distribution of 
income. This measure is far from ideal. Limited to income size, it says nothing explicit 
about the distribution between capitalists and non-capitalists (although it is reasonable to 
assume that much of the top income is earned by capitalists); it ignores the differential 
processes of accumulation that affect the distribution of income and assets within capital; 
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and it tell us little about the non-income power underpinnings of capitalisation.7 But the 
size distributional measure has one major advantage: thanks to the painstaking work of a 
few researchers, its data are available for an extended period, from 1917 to 2008. 
Such data are presented in Figure 2. The thin line shows the per cent share of 
‘market income’, inclusive of capital gains, accounted for by the top 10% of the U.S. 
population. The thick line expresses the 5-year moving average of the underlying series.  
 
Figure 2 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital gains; it excludes 
government transfers. Grey areas indicate periods during which the 5-year moving 
average of the data series exceeded 45%. The last data point is for 2008; 
  
SOURCE: Piketty, Thomas, and Saez. 2004. Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913-2002. Monograph, pp. 1-92. Updated until 2008 at 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2008.xls; data sheet: data-Figure1 
(retrieved on February 7, 2011).  
 
The numbers draw a striking U-pattern, with its twin peaks marked by the 1930s on the 
left and the 2000s on the right. In both periods, the income share of the top 10% of the 
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population averaged over 45% and at some point approached 50%. And both periods are 
unique. In between, from the early 1940s to the early 1980s, the numbers are far lower, 
averaging less than 35% and hardly changing from year to year.  
Of course, historical patterns per se do not reveal their own glass ceiling (which 
is why economists can never specify the maximum amount of profit, or the highest 
possible growth rate). But although there is no way to know for sure, it seems to us, 
however impressionistically, that 45% is fairly close to the glass ceiling for this measure. 
The bull market of the 1980s and 1990s was associated with a rise of more than 40% in 
the top’s income share (from 33% to 47%, and to nearly 50% more recently), along with 
significant reductions in interest rates, effective corporate tax rates and profit volatility. 
And since the latter reductions would be difficult to replicate, a similar bull run from here 
onward would require the top income share to rise to more than 70%. Such an increase is 
highly improbable – that is, unless the U.S. turns into a dictatorship of the kind described 
in Jack London’s Iron Heel (1907) or Vladimir Sorokin’s Day of the Oprichnik (2011). 
And given that in the 1930s the top income share peaked at around current levels, it is not 
far fetched to take 45% as the Zeno-like cutoff point beyond which the ruling class enters 
hubris territory: confident in its enormous power, but aware that this power is difficult to 
increase much further.8 
So now we have two criteria for systemic crisis: (1) a major bear market; and 
(2) extreme income and asset inequality, indicative of peak capitalist power and an 
inability to increase that power significantly. It is at this point, when these two conditions 
of systemic crisis are fulfilled, that systemic fear – fear for the very future of capitalism – 
becomes possible. And according to the available data, these two conditions have 
coincided only twice since the First World War: during the the late 1920s and 1930s, and 
again during the 2000s. 
 
The Dominant Dogma and Forward-Looking Capitalisation 
 
Now, note that these two conditions imply a potential for systemic fear. To know 
whether capitalists have actually been struck by such fear, we need a third condition. And 
that third condition is the breakdown of forward-looking capitalisation.  
In our ‘Systemic Fear’, we argued that, under the normal circumstances of 
‘business as usual’, capitalists are conditioned by their dominant dogma to follow the 
ritual of capitalisation; that, in following this ritual, they express their belief that their 
system is eternal; and that this belief in turn implies that they are confident in their rule 
and in the obedience of the ruled (we deal with Kliman’s objection to this point later in 
the article). 
However, in times of systemic crisis – i.e., when capitalism is mired in a major 
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bear market, and when extreme inequalities, having pushed capital toward its envelope, 
make further increases in power difficult if not impossible to achieve – there arises the 
prospect of systemic fear. If that fear takes hold, with capitalists no longer certain of the 
future of their system, their ability to look forward is seriously impaired. And when 
looking into the future becomes impossible, the ritual of forward-looking finance breaks 
down.  
One indication of such a breakdown, we argued in our paper, is a tight, positive 
correlation between the rates of change of stock prices and current earnings. When 
capitalists adhere to the capitalisation ritual, they price stocks based on the earnings trend 
all the way to the deep future (from the ‘standpoint of eternity’, as finance guru Benjamin 
Graham put it). But when capitalists are struck by systemic fear, the ritual breaks down, 
by definition. With the future of capitalism deeply uncertain, the long-term earnings 
trend becomes undefined, and undefined earnings cannot be incorporated into the 
capitalisation formula. So capitalists have to look for an alternative. They need something 
they are sure of and which is visible here and now. And that something, we argued, is 
current earnings.  
Now note the causal direction here: systemic fear creates a tight positive 
correlation between the growth rates of equity prices and current earnings. But the 
reverse isn’t necessarily true: in and of itself, a positive correlation between the growth 
rates of equity prices and current earnings does not necessarily mean that capitalists have 
been struck by systemic fear.  
This point wasn’t properly articulated in our paper, so it is important to clarify 
it. To reiterate, according to the forward-looking capitalisation formula, equity prices 
discount the long-term earnings trend. Current earnings do not appear in the 
capitalisation formula, so in principle they should have no direct impact on share prices.9 
However, current earnings can still have an indirect, apparent effect. During certain 
periods, one or more of the capitalisation components can become correlated with 
current earnings, and if that happens, we may end up with a spurious correlation. For 
instance, changes in current earnings could be – and sometimes are – correlated 
negatively with changes in the rate of interest. And since the rate of interest features in 
capitalisation, the result could be a spurious correlation between the growth rates of 
current earnings and stock prices. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent such a spurious 
correlation from cropping up during periods of systemic fear; and if it does crop up, the 
impact of current earnings on equity prices may become more difficult to disentangle.10  
For this reason, the correlation between the growth rates of stock prices and 
current earnings becomes meaningful only in times of systemic crisis. It is only then, 
when capitalism is pulled down by a major bear market and capitalists are approaching 
their hubris-point of peak power, that such a correlation could be taken as indicative of 
systemic fear. 
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Figure 3 shows the levels and rates of change of equity prices and earnings per 
share (with rates of change expressed as 3-year moving averages). The grey areas indicate 
periods of high positive correlation between the rate-of-growth series at the bottom of the 
figures (including the period pointed out by Kliman). The correlation coefficients for the 
different periods are listed in Table 2. 
 
Figure 3 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871-2011 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in the previous twelve 
months. Monthly earnings are interpolated from annual data before 1926 and from 
quarterly data after 1926. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. 
Both series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 1929=100. The last data 
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points are June 2010 for earnings per share and January 2011 for price; SOURCE: 
Robert Shiller, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls.  
 
Table 2 
S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the 
Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share 
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Figure 3. 
 
The data show four periods of high positive correlation: the period leading up to 1917; 
the 1930s; the early 1950s to the early 1970s; and, finally, the 2000s. But based on our 
earlier discussion, only two of these periods can be associated with systemic fear. This 
association is summarised in the timeline of Table 3, which provides data on our three 
criteria for systemic fear. The table covers the period from the 1820s to the present, 
although the data coverage is uneven and allows conclusions to be drawn only from 1917 
onwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERIOD CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
    Jan 1873 – Oct 1917 + 0.72 
   Oct 1917 – Mar 2010 + 0.35  
Oct 1917 – Dec 1929 + 0.29 
Dec 1929 – Feb 1939 + 0.89 
Feb 1939 – Jun 1953 – 0.34 
Jun 1953 – Aug 1962 + 0.90 
Aug 1962 – Dec 1973 + 0.80 
Dec 1973 – Sep 2000 – 0.20 
Su
b 
pe
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ds
 
Sep 2000 – Mar 2010 + 0.65 
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Table 3 
Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States 
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas denote periods of (1) major bear markets; (2) peaks of capitalist 
power as indicated by extreme income inequality; and (3) periods of a high positive 
correlation between the growth rates of share prices and earnings per share. The dashed 
lines delineate the two periods that fulfil all three criteria: 1929–1939 and 2000–2010. 
  
SOURCE: Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
 
 The first criterion is a major bear market, based on the long-term trend and pattern 
of the stock market expressed in ‘constant dollars’. Based on these considerations, 
the United States has experienced six major bear markets since the 1820s.  
 
 The second criterion is peak capitalist power, based on extreme income inequality. 
This condition has been fulfilled twice since 1917: from 1927 to 1940 and from 
2000 to 2008 (with the stock market having recovered since 2008, it is not far 
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fetched to assume that income inequality continues to hover at peak levels). 
Combining these two conditions, we can conclude that only two of the four major 
bear markets since the beginning of the twentieth century have contained a systemic 
crisis: the periods from 1929 to 1940 and the period from 2000 to 2010. 
 
 The criterion for systemic fear is systemic crisis during which the rates of change of 
stock prices and current earnings are tightly and positively correlated. Such positive 
correlation existed during four periods since the 1890s. But only two of these 
periods were ones of systemic crisis: 1929-1939 and 2000-2010.11  
 
In sum: Kliman found an oversight in our paper on ‘Systemic Fear’ and celebrated it as if 
it pulled the rug out from under our entire argument. But that oversight, although 
inconvenient and regrettable, hardly dents our broader argument. Capitalism remains the 
first mode of power to offer a quantitative indicator for systemic fear. This indicator 
involves the convergence of three conditions that we have discussed at great length in our 
work: a major bear market, a glass ceiling of peak capitalist power, and the breakdown of 
the dominant dogma of forwarding-looking finance. And these conditions have 
coincided only in the two periods indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’ – the 1930s and the 2000s. 
 
Toward Behavioural Marxism? 
 
But Kliman claims that the problem is not only empirical; it’s also theoretical. Think of a 
situation, he says, in which ‘you’ (the investor?) believe that capitalism is about to 
collapse, but you are not entirely sure (the probability of collapse is less than 100 per 
cent). Next, assume that someone comes along and invites you to make a small 
investment that will yield an extremely high rate of return. If capitalism collapses, you lose 
your investment (no pain, no gain); but if it doesn’t, you become fabulously rich 
(fulfilling your mission on earth). Now, between you and me (wink), wouldn’t you grab 
this golden opportunity and invest? And given that you would go ahead and invest 
(assuming you are like most people – i.e. most capitalists), isn’t your decision a clear 
proof that the future of capitalism is irrelevant for capitalists (like you)? 
And if the logic of greed isn’t enough, there are the scientific experiments. 
According to Kliman, these experiments repeatedly show that ‘people’ (capitalists?) 
continue to invest in stocks, almost to the very end. They invest when earnings go up; 
they invest when earnings come down; in fact, they invest even when they know, with 
certainty, that earnings will converge to zero and that the equities they buy will become 
worthless at a definite point in time. And since these experiments show that the 
investment behaviour of people (capitalists?) is more or less independent of the future of 
their system (i.e., the end of the experiment), the very notion of ‘systemic fear’ – at least in 
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the way that Bichler and Nitzan describe it – is irrelevant and in fact meaningless.  
These are very interesting claims, particularly when coming from a 
fundamentalist Marxist.12  
Marxism correctly rejects the neoclassical dogma. The neoclassical tenets – 
egocentrism, the emphasis on individual rationality, the belief that the market is natural, 
the sanctification of private property and the rejection of societal planning, to name but a 
few – are not natural laws, but the mere objectification of the capitalist creed. According 
to Marxist epistemology, the autonomous, utility-maximising individual is an oxymoron; 
an impossibility that can be concocted only by the misguided ideological servants of 
capital. From the viewpoint of Marxists, human beings are not stand-alone entities, but 
creatures of their society. They have a certain freedom to think and act, but in the final 
analysis, their thoughts and actions are bound by the class relations and the forces of 
production of their own historical epoch. 
Adhering to this epistemology, though, has proven easier said than done. 
Although critical of the liberals, Marxists have by and large failed to develop their own 
accounting system, their own unique data and their own dedicated research methods. 
And so, gradually, pressed by academic necessity and tempted by the available alternative, 
they have gravitated toward the ever-expanding databases and increasingly sophisticated 
methods of their class enemy, the bourgeoisie. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Marxists started to use the capitalist national 
accounts and measurements of the ‘capital stocks’. But there was a hefty price to pay: the 
derivation of these quantities relies on the very assumptions that Marxists correctly reject. 
‘Real GDP’, for instance, is aggregated based on the supposition that the statistician 
knows equilibrium prices, and that these equilibrium prices reflect the relative utilities of 
the produced goods and services. Similarly with the ‘capital stock’: its magnitude, which 
many Marxists cite without a second thought, is taken to measure the util-generating 
capacity of the underlying machines and structures. And so, paradoxically, when Marxists 
routinely employ such measures to denote economic growth rates or the pace of capital 
accumulation, they end up endorsing the conceptual tools with which the ruling capitalist 
class manages society, as well as the individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium ideology that this 
ruling class imposes.13  
And that is just for starters. In subsequent decades, many Marxists began using 
bourgeois econometrics, and in so doing abandoned the last vestige of dialectics. They 
developed closed models with mathematical propositions and proofs, and in so doing 
made their arguments increasingly ahistorical. They succumbed to the elegance of game 
theory, and in so doing accepted the rational-atomistic starting point of conventional 
economics. And now we learn from Kliman that it is perfectly fine for a Marxist to invoke 
the findings of experimental economics and behavioural finance.  
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Now, as noted, our own work starts from finance. This choice has nothing do 
with convenience or fashion. We start from finance because finance is the heart and brain 
of the modern capitalist mode of power. The capitalisation ritual of finance is the 
algorithm with which capitalists creorder their society, and the relative magnitudes that 
emerge from that ritual map the ever-changing terrain of capitalised power. Deciphering 
modern finance is the initial step for any understanding of how modern capitalist power 
is organised, imposed and altered. 
Kliman, though, adheres to a different approach. For him the only real capital is 
one created by production denominated in socially necessary abstract labour time (or its 
‘real’ price equivalent). The rest – i.e., finance – is a speculative operation in the sphere of 
exchange that sometimes matches and sometimes mismatches the movement of actual 
capital. And whatever has to do with speculations, bubbles and other mismatches or 
distortions can be safely delegated to the neoclassical experiments of Nobel laureates and 
the psychological analysis of behavioural finance.  
But then, if this is the micro-Marxism Kliman has to offer, it is a strange one 
indeed: a representative experiment of representative gamblers, sans quotes, who serve to 
represent the universal human bourse, with no classes, no struggle, no dialectics, for ever 
and ever. Note that the participants in Kliman’s experiments are not capitalists, but 
‘people’ (in America everyone has an equal opportunity to buy up Microsoft or sleep 
under the bridge). These people are examined not in a real, power-based society, but in a 
laboratory ‘game’ for which they are hired or volunteer (since, at the moment, the 
experiment is still too complicated for rats). There is no ruling class, no power belt and no 
underlying population of workers, unemployed and the redundant. There is only a 
collection of Marshallian ‘representatives’. These ideal types play their game not in order 
to control their society and shape their world, but simply to make a buck (the universal 
drive of all people at all times, even if the buck happens to be hypothetical). And most 
importantly, the questions they face have no bearing on their own future, let alone on the 
future of their society. Once the experiment is over (and capitalism ends) they can go 
home and forget all about it.  
The ultimate purpose of these experiments is to discover, once and for all, the 
eternal human ‘nature’ of the universal investor – and in the process to annul the very 
heart of Marxism. According to Alan Greenspan, this human nature can be conventional, 
or perverse. What matters, he explains, is “not whether human response is rational or 
irrational, only that it is observable and systematic” (Greenspan, 2008). And perhaps 
Kliman feels that Marxists have much to learn from these natural-state-of-things models 
that the capitalist rulers impose on themselves and on their subjects. What remains 
unclear, though, is how any of this relates to the long-term outlook of the capitalist ruling 
class. To use simulated stock market experiments to tell us about the systemic confidence 
and fear of present-day capitalists is like using a chess game to understand the mindset of 
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the French nobility during the French Revolution, or a board game of Monopoly to 
understand the anxiety of capitalists during the 1930s.  
In our paper, we claimed that capitalist belief in the permanence of 
capitalisation is a prerequisite for investment. This is a foundational claim. It deals not 
with this or that profit flow, with this or that asset, or with this or that capitalist. Instead, it 
refers to the basic institution of the capitalist mode of power: the institution that makes 
finance in general and capitalist calculations in particular possible to begin with, the 
institution that pervades everything capitalists do, the institution that holds their power 
structure together. The validity of our claim is tied to the centrality of this institution, and 
that is why we expressed our claim hypothetically, as a thought experiment. This is also 
why we brought different historical examples of systemic collapse – from the fall of the 
last Babylonian emperor Belshazzar, to the French Revolution, to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union – instances during which a latent but deep crisis suddenly gave way to 
disintegration. The crises themselves had different causes; but what made them 
culminate in collapse, we argued, was that the rulers were struck by systemic fear: they 
lost their confidence in their own dogma and their ability to rule. And such losses – as 
well as their consequences – are difficult if not impossible to predict.  
“[T]he future comes disguised”, says Coetzee; “if it came naked, we would be 
petrified by what we saw” (1990, p. 163). To ask what will happen to capitalism if 
capitalists become convinced that capitalisation is about to end is like asking what will 
happen to the ecosystem if earth surface temperature rises by 25 per cent. No laboratory, 
even one run by a Nobel laureate, can replicate this process.  
Finally, Kliman invokes the ‘S’-word: Bicher and Nitzan, he says, have turned 
capital into a ‘Subject’, capable of triggering its own demise, and they have voiced this 
claim using tongue-twisting concepts and irrefutable Freudian conjectures. We prefer to 
remain silent on the second allegation. The interested reader can judge for herself by 
reading our articles and books. But we have to plead guilty to the first accusation. Capital 
is certainly a subject, and with a capital ‘S’ to boot. In fact, if we are to remain true to Marx, 
we should add that, save for rare revolutionary situations, capital is the only social subject, 
the entity that subjugates all else – capitalists as well as workers – to its will and rage.  
 
Marxists Contra Marx 
 
Kliman seems to have been deeply offended by our position ‘versus Marx’, as he puts it, so 
a few closing comments about this subject may be in order.  
We have the greatest admiration for Marx as a revolutionary scientist, and we 
have learned a great deal from his path-breaking work on the capitalist system. But like 
Marx (and unlike many Marxists), our real interest is not in Marx, it is in capitalism.  
Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
 
  
112 
Marx tried to trace the intricacies of human history, to map its progressive 
breakthroughs, and to understand its regressive setbacks. He focused on the critical 
aspects of the capitalist regime, searching for weak points in the fortified walls that 
protected the capitalist rulers. He tried to anticipate the development of capitalism, to 
identify the inner contradictions that would pave the way for a revolution.  
But Marx’s work mirrored his own epoch. And as capitalism continued to 
develop and mutate, his theories, research and conclusions have become less and less 
congruent with the ever-changing reality. As a result, radicals have come to face two 
mutually exclusive options. In the words of Cornelius Castoriadis, they have had to 
decide whether to remain revolutionaries or ‘Marxists’. To choose the former meant to 
take from Marx what seemed true, insightful and useful – and to let go of the rest. To 
choose the latter meant to sanctify all of Marx’s writings and then constantly ‘reinterpret’ 
them to fit the shifting reality. 
Some radicals chose the former path, but many more took the latter. After 
Marx’s death, there emerged numerous congregations and sects, each with its own 
theological interpretation. Until the 1960s and 1970s, the fault lines were largely 
geopolitical. The main debate was between Moscow and Beijing, with subsidiary 
interpretations emerging later on in lesser communist capitals, such Belgrade, Havana 
and Pyongyang.  
The unravelling of Stalinism and Maoism and the winding down of the Cold 
War shifted the centre of gravity to the universities of Europe and North America. But 
that shift hasn’t liberated the Marxists from Marx. Instead of an open-ended scientific 
debate on the changing nature of capitalism, there developed a closed theological debate 
about the eternal nature of Marx’s writings (what did Marx really mean?). There are 
exceptions – some of which are ingenious – but for many Marxists the key questions have 
become those of how to appropriate the prophet’s writing; and of what might be done to 
fortify the faith.  
The consequence is a minute division of labour, not unlike the neoclassical 
one, between different groups of Marxists and post-Marxists, each of which specialises in 
protecting a different section of the Great Marxist Wall. There are experts on the ‘young 
Marx’, on ‘Marxist philosophy’ and on ‘Marxist dialectics’. Some deal with the ‘Marxist 
theory of the state’, while others focus on ‘cultural Marxism’. There are pundits for 
‘analytical Marxism’, ‘Marxism and game theory’, and ‘Marxist anthropology’. There are 
even those who claim to do ‘political Marxism’ (suggesting that Marxism can also be a-
political). Within ‘Marxian economics’ proper, there are those who do ‘crisis’, others who 
do ‘regulation and the social structures of accumulation’, and still others who do 
‘investment and profit rates’. There is even a specialisation in ‘fictitious capital’ and its 
various distortions. The list goes on. Of course, not all of these specialists are defensive of 
the dogma, but many are. 
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 At the analytical heart of these specialised endeavours stand the experts on 
Marx’s labour theory of value and surplus value. Most Marxists are unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of this theory, and most ‘productive labourers’, however defined, would 
probably find its language impossible to understand – that is, assuming they even tried. 
But this theory is the foundation stone of Marx’s science.14 It is the key to understanding 
capitalist exploitation, capitalist development, and, eventually, capitalism’s own demise. It 
has to be defended, if only in appearance.  
This is the forte of Andrew Kliman. His own section in the Great Marxist Wall 
is the theory’s internal ‘consistency’. This section has been somewhat weakened since 
Bortkiewicz, but not to worry. A new and improved reading of the theory – the Temporal 
Single System Interpretation, or TSSI – has recently been applied to the weak points, and 
apparently it works wonders.15  
For defenders such as Kliman, the key thing is to save Marx from deviant 
interpretations. Our 2009 Capital as Power contains a systematic critique of liberal and 
Marxist theories of capital and the elementary particles of utils and abstract labour on 
which these theories rest; it develops an alternative approach to capital based on power; it 
offers an analytical, historical and empirical exposition of a new theory of differential 
accumulation; and it provides a new history of the capitalist mode of power. In short, it is 
an important book to ignore – and, indeed, so far no Marxist has reviewed it. Even 
Kliman, who broke the wall of silence, is careful to ignore the gist of our framework, 
theory and findings: his main concern is to defend his own defence of Marx’s value theory 
– a defence that our book deals with only briefly.  
Sadly, the zeal to defend Marx has caused many of the defenders to lose their 
grip on reality. The period since 2000 has seen capitalism rocked by major turbulence, 
and the free-market dogma has been challenged openly from within and without. Liberal 
economics – including its macro and micro variants, its Keynesian and Monetarist 
inflections, its expectations and game theories – seems to have lost its intellectual 
compass, and there have been open calls on Nobel laureates to return their Sveriges 
Riksbank Prizes. This has been the historical opportunity Marxists have been waiting for 
since the 1930s, and they seem to have missed it. Instead of developing new theories and 
new research programmes, they were busy defending Marx and ridiculing or simply 
ignoring radicals who tried to transcend him. And when the time finally came, they were 
caught off guard. Marxists today talk of speculative-fictitious bubbles and the tendency of 
the rate of profit to fall, of a too-weak or a too-strong state, of capitalist irrationality, greed 
and corruption. But deep down inside, many of them know that these reiterations belong 
to the world of yesterday. They offer no serious challenge, let alone an alternative, to the 
current capitalist mode of power.  
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Notes 
 
1 The difference between heteronomy and autonomy is articulated in the social and 
philosophical writings of Cornelius Castoriadis – see, for example, his Philosophy, 
Politics, Autonomy (1991). 
2 Means’ claim that there were in fact two types of prices – administered prices as well as 
market prices – was brilliantly defended against charges of empirical error levelled by 
Chicago School Nobel laureate George Stigler, but eventually swept under the carpet 
by the economics profession. By contrast, his empirical data on the separation of 
corporate control from ownership were shown to be faulty by the relatively unknown 
Marxist Maurice Zeitlin, yet continue to inform mainstream business studies (see 
Berle and Means, 1932; Means, 1935, 1972; Stigler and Kindahl, 1970, 1973; and 
Zeitlin, 1974).  
3 One of the first, and still unparalleled, histories of cosmology is Arthur Koestler’s The 
Sleepwalkers (1959), a story that is nicely complemented by Simon Singh’s more 
recent Big Bang (2004). On the measurement of the standard meter, see Alder’s The 
Measure of All Things (2002). The development of mathematics is told in Singh’s 
Fermat’s Last Theorem (1997). 
4 These dualities are introduced in Part I of Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009), 
and are further developed in the rest of the book. 
5 This definition is more precise than the one in Bichler and Nitzan (2008). In the 
original article, we referred to a downtrend in stock prices. Here we operationalise this 
downtrend as a falling 10-year centred moving average.  
6 The measurement of ‘constant dollars’ involves significant theoretical and philosophical 
quandaries that economists are yet to solve. Our concern here, though, is not the 
logical underpinnings of the measurement, but the mindset of capitalists. And since 
capitalists take constant-dollar measures for granted, these difficulties need not distract 
us (for more on these issues, see Nitzan, 1992: Chs. 5 and 7).  
7 On the differential ratio of net profit to wages, see Bichler and Nitzan’s ‘Elementary 
Particles of the Capitalist Mode of Power’ (2006: Figure 5). On capital’s share of 
national income, aggregate concentration and differential accumulation, see Nitzan 
and Bichler’s Capital as Power (2009a: Figure 13.1, p. 274; Figure 14.1, p. 318; and 
Figure 14.2, p. 320). 
8 Elsewhere in our work we examined the differential process by which capitalist power 
breaks through its geographic-societal ‘envelopes’ – from the industry, to the sector, to 
the national setting, and, finally, to the global arena (e.g. see Nitzan, 2001; Nitzan and 
Bichler, 2009a, Ch. 15). In this process, the power of capitalists that are based in one 
region or country could expand by creating, altering and taking over capitalist power in 
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other regions and countries. U.S.-based capitalists have done so after the 1930s by 
raising the profit share of their foreign subsidiaries from 5 per cent to over 30 per cent 
of the total. But since this redistribution too is self-limiting, a repeat of that process 
nowadays seems less than likely. 
9 Current earnings feature in capitalisation only insofar as they alter the long-term 
earnings trend. In the case of corporate equities, this impact usually is negligible and 
can be ignored.  
10 For example, during much of the period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, the 
rates of change of equity prices and the rate of interest were negatively correlated (with 
interest rates measured by the tax-free yield on AAA municipal bonds). This negative 
association means that, during that period, the observed correlation between the rates 
of change of equity prices and current profits identified by Kliman may have been 
spurious. The same cannot be said about the 2000s, since the rates-of-change 
correlation between equity prices and the rate of interest during that period was 
positive. The case of the 1930s is more ambiguous. There was a negative correlation 
between the rates of change of prices and the rate of interest, but the variations of the 
rate of interest were very small relative to the variations in current earnings, suggesting 
that their impact on prices was probably far smaller than the impact of current 
earnings. 
11 Although it is probably too early to tell, the 2010 data in Figure 3 suggest that the 
correlation between the rates of change of stock prices and current earnings is no 
longer positive. A continuation of this situation would mean that capitalists no longer 
suffer from systemic fear.  
12 For the difference between neo-Marxists and fundamentalist Marxists, see for example 
Sherman (1985). 
13 For more on the individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium assumptions of ‘real’ economic 
measurements, see Nitzan (1989) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Chs. 5 and 8). 
14 Marx claimed his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it 
did something they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit from the material 
conditions of the labour process. Prices of production, writes Marx, “are conditioned 
on the existence of an average rate of profit’, which itself ‘must be deduced out of the 
values of commodities … Without such a deduction, an average rate of profit (and 
consequently a price of production of commodities), remains a vague and senseless 
conception” (Marx, 1909, Vol. 3, pp. 185-86, emphasis added). This same point is 
reiterated by Engels: ‘These two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of 
history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production through surplus value, 
we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science. The next thing 
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was to work out all its details and relations’ (Engels, 1966, Section I, emphases added). 
15 According to Kliman and McGlone (1999, pp. 33-34), the TSSI “vindicates the 
internal consistency of Marx’s most challenged theoretical results without 
relinquishing his theory’s quantitative determinacy or absorbing it into the theories of 
his critics”, and “is able to make sense out of crucial aspects of [Marx’s] value theory 
that the standard interpretation (and others) have always found to be incoherent” (p. 
55). See also Kliman (2004; 2007).  
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